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ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP AND 
THE FCC 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO* 
ABSTRACT 
Most First Amendment analyses of U.S. media policy have focused 
predominantly on “behavioral” regulation, which either prohibits the 
transmission of disfavored content (such as indecent programming) or 
mandates the dissemination of preferred content (such as children’s 
educational programming and political speech). In so doing, commentators 
have largely overlooked how program content is also affected by 
“structural” regulation, which focuses primarily on increasing the 
economic competitiveness of media industries. In this Article, Professor 
Christopher Yoo employs economic analysis to demonstrate how structural 
regulation can constitute a form of “architectural censorship” that has the 
unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
media content. The specific examples analyzed include (1) efforts to foster 
and preserve free television and radio, (2) rate regulation of cable 
television, (3) horizontal restrictions on the number of outlets one entity 
can own in a local market, and (4) regulations limiting vertical integration 
in television and radio. Unfortunately, current First Amendment doctrine 
effectively immunizes architectural censorship from meaningful 
constitutional scrutiny, and it appears unlikely that existing doctrine will 
change or that Congress or the Federal Communications Commission will 
step in to fill the void. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. This Article benefited from questions by 
participants at the Conference on Federal Regulation and the Cultural Landscape, sponsored by the 
Curb Center for Art, Enterprise, and Public Policy at Vanderbilt University, as well as the 32nd Annual 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. I am also grateful to Stuart Benjamin, Owen Fiss, 
Jonathan Levy, Richard Nagareda, Robert Pepper, and Bob Rasmussen for their comments on earlier 
drafts, and Kate Albers and Paul Werner for their expert research assistance. I would like to offer 
special thanks to my friend, Ed Baker, for his willingness to engage in the lively and constructive 
intellectual exchange about my ideas appearing in this Article. I can offer no higher praise than to say 
that I have spent much of my career inspired by and responding to his work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent events have suddenly turned the media ownership regulations 
promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) into a 
hot topic. In 2001 and 2002, a remarkable series of decisions by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated significant portions of the 
FCC’s media ownership restrictions.1 Moreover, the reasoning of the 
opinions, which at times chided the FCC for failing to honor its statutory 
obligation to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer 
in the public interest,”2 casts doubt on the validity of a number of the 
FCC’s other media ownership provisions. With its regulatory scheme 
thrown into disarray, the FCC undertook its most comprehensive 
reexamination of media ownership regulations in decades, which resulted 
in a mammoth order that loosened many of the most prominent 
restrictions.3 
The prospect of widespread media consolidation touched off a 
political firestorm.4 Congress responded by enacting legislation partially 
scaling back the most salient of the FCC’s regulatory changes.5 Numerous 
 
 1. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162–64 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invalidating 
the FCC’s rule restricting ownership of more than one television station in any local market); Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating the FCC’s rules limiting the 
number of television stations one entity can own nationally and prohibiting joint ownership of a 
television station and local cable operator in the same city), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating the FCC’s rule 
limiting the number of cable subscribers one entity can reach nationwide). 
 2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–12. The 
scope of this statutory mandate has generated substantial controversy. The D.C. Circuit initially 
interpreted section 202(h) as erecting “a presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership 
rules.” Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1048. See also Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 159 
(citing with approval the quoted language from Fox Television Stations). Subsequent decisions have 
been somewhat more circumspect. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 394, 423 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the idea that section 202(h) serves as a “one-way ratchet”); Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 
357 F.3d 88, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Fox Television Stations and Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group left open whether section 202(h) created a presumption in favor of eliminating 
existing regulations). 
 3. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
Biennial Review Order]. 
 4. See, e.g., Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 645 
(2004) (reviewing the political controversies surrounding the FCC’s media ownership decision). 
 5. Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 
(scaling back the FCC’s decision to liberalize the number of television stations one entity could own 
nationwide). For further discussion, see infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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parties challenged the FCC’s actions in court, some contending that the 
amendments were too sweeping and others arguing that they did not go far 
enough. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed, and 
ultimately invalidated, the FCC’s order.6 These decisions gave the FCC 
precious little guidance regarding the types of changes that will be 
necessary in order for the media ownership regulations to survive judicial 
review. The resulting uncertainty threatens to undermine forthcoming 
mergers whose legality depend on the less restrictive limits that the FCC 
sought to impose. What will happen next is anyone’s guess. 
Although the bulk of the commentary on these events has focused on 
the relative merits of the FCC’s actions and the court’s decision to strike 
them down, I would like to analyze these events from a somewhat broader 
perspective. What I find most interesting are the specific grounds invoked 
by the courts to invalidate the media ownership rules. In most instances, the 
courts based their actions on principles of administrative law while largely 
rejecting challenges based on the First Amendment.7 The failure of these 
challenges is consistent with the conventional wisdom concerning the 
constitutionality of ownership restrictions. It has long been recognized that 
measures directly regulating the behavior of media speakers—either by 
prohibiting the transmission of disfavored content, such as indecent 
programming,8 or by mandating the dissemination of preferred content, 
such as children’s educational programming and political speech9—raise 
serious First Amendment problems. Ownership restrictions and other forms 
of structural regulation are generally thought to pose fewer constitutional 
concerns.10 Consequently, although the constitutionality of behavioral 
 
 6. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 372 (remanding portions of the order), petition 
for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2005) (Nos. 04-1020 & 04-1036), and 73 U.S.L.W. 
3466 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2005) (Nos. 04-1033 & 04-1045); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 
2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (staying the FCC’s media ownership order). 
 7. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 401–02; Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–
69; Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1045–47. For notable exceptions, see infra notes 79, 165, 283 
and accompanying text. 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). 
 9. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303b(a)(2), 335(b)(1) (requiring broadcasters to offer children’s 
educational programming); id. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (requiring broadcasters to provide access to political 
candidates). 
 10. See, e.g., Am. Family Ass’n v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1156, 1168–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ruggiero v. 
FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc); Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–68; Fox 
Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1046; Leflore Broad. Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 458 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the “New Media”—New Directions in Regulating 
Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1979); Timothy G. Gauger, Comment, The 
Constitutionality of the FCC’s Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 NW. U. 
L. REV. 665, 673 (1989). 
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regulation has been the subject of extensive academic commentary, the 
constitutionality of structural regulation has received considerably less 
attention.11 A complete analysis of the impact of structural regulation on 
program content has yet to appear in the literature. 
This Article seeks to move beyond those previous analyses by offering 
a more comprehensive discussion of the ways that structural regulation 
affects media content. Part I explores a series of examples in which 
structural regulation has had a dramatic influence on the content of speech. 
The specific examples include: (1) efforts to foster free television over pay 
television, (2) rate regulation of cable television, (3) restrictions on the 
number of media outlets one entity can own in any media market, and (4) 
regulations limiting vertical integration in television and radio. Each of 
these examples was enacted to further three interests that the Supreme 
Court has determined to be unrelated to the content of expression: the 
preservation of free, local broadcasting; the promotion of competition; and 
the need to foster a diversity of sources and viewpoints.12 
Each case demonstrates how structural regulation can have unintended 
effects on media content. Not only do these structural regulations tend to 
reduce the overall quantity and quality of media programming, they also 
 
 11. One analysis focused on the relatively narrow issue of whether particular structural 
regulations were enacted out of conscious effort to promote a diversity of viewpoints. See Jonathan W. 
Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 
(1989). Other scholars have offered general discussions of how media concentration supposedly 
threatens the democratic values that they see underlying the constitutional commitment to free speech. 
See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839 (2002) 
[hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration]; Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the 
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 
561 (2000); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media 
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813; Lawrence Lessig, The 
Censorships of Television (Mar. 8, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/tv.pdf). For my criticism of efforts to reconceptualize free 
speech in civic republican terms, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 306–46 (2003). More importantly for our 
purposes, these analyses have not engaged in any extended analysis of the precise relationship between 
media concentration and media content. Other scholars have analyzed the First Amendment 
implications of a single type of structural regulation without offering a more general analysis of the 
relationship between structural regulation and content. See C. Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, 
17 HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L.J. 97 (1994) (discussing the constitutionality of a provision barring 
crossownership of local telephone and cable operations); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: 
Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the free speech 
implications of federal spectrum policy). The most complete discussion of the issue is C. EDWIN 
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 20–62 (2002) (discussing the impact of advertising 
support and local concentration on content). Even Baker’s analysis stops short of exploring the full 
range of complexities of how structure and content interact. 
 12. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) [hereinafter “Turner I”]. 
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affect the diversity of media content. Put another way, structural regulation 
can represent a form of “architectural censorship”13 that can have a 
tangential, but substantial, adverse impact on speech.14 In so doing, my 
analysis reveals that previous First Amendment discussions of structural 
regulation have simultaneously been too broad and too narrow. They have 
been too broad in their tendency to simply posit that media concentration 
necessarily represents a threat to free speech without engaging in any 
searching analysis of the precise nature of the relationship between 
concentration and content. This analysis suggests that the relationship 
between media concentration and the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
media content is more complex than is generally realized. At the same 
time, prior analyses have been too narrow in restricting their focus to media 
concentration. My analysis identifies other structural features that pose 
even more serious dangers of architectural censorship than do the concerns 
about industry concentration patterns that have dominated the existing 
scholarship. 
Part II examines how the identified instances of architectural 
censorship would fare when measured against current First Amendment 
doctrine. Given the potentially adverse impact that structural regulation can 
have on the content of speech, one would hope that the First Amendment 
would provide a basis for identifying and redressing architectural 
 
 13. Professor Baker correctly notes that the term “censorship” is most applicable to situations in 
which the government deliberately attempts to affect the content of speech. See C. Edwin Baker, Media 
Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 754–755 & n.71 
(2005). I concede that I use the term in part to add a touch of rhetorical flourish to my argument. That 
said, the censorship label may be more apt than initially appears. Many early attempts to regulate media 
structure were intended to influence media content. See, e.g., Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 
3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television 
Broadcasting Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 291–93 (1953) (noting that national ownership 
rules were designed in part to “maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints”) 
[hereinafter 1953 Multiple Ownership Order]; FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, REPORT ON CHAIN 
BROADCASTING 65 (1941) (imposing the Chain Broadcasting Rules in part because network control 
hampers local stations’ ability to “broadcast[] such outstanding local events as community concerts, 
civic meetings, local sports events, and other programs of local consumer and social interest”). See also 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that 
seemingly structural measures designed to protect free broadcasting were really motivated by a desire to 
promote more local, educational, and public affairs-related content); Christopher H. Sterling, Television 
and Radio Broadcasting, in WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE 
MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 299, 310 (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2d ed. 1982) (noting that “the FCC has 
followed an unwritten but fairly clear policy of seeking to modify the ownership of broadcasting 
facilities as a means of effecting changes in content”). 
 14. In some respects, my analysis bears some similarity to Lawrence Lessig’s claim that Internet 
protocols represent architectural elements that can censor in much the same manner as the government. 
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); Lessig, supra note 11. The 
analytical tools that I employ and the claims that I advance are quite different from Professor Lessig’s. 
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censorship when it arises. Unfortunately, such hopes are misplaced. Recent 
judicial decisions indicate that the most stringent standard of review that 
might be applied to structural regulation is the intermediate scrutiny 
announced in United States v. O’Brien.15 O’Brien doctrine has been widely 
criticized as being too deferential.16 As a result, current Supreme Court 
precedent effectively insulates instances of architectural censorship from 
meaningful constitutional scrutiny. 
Part III briefly explores possible solutions to the de facto 
constitutional immunity enjoyed by architectural censorship. Although 
courts could leave resolution of these constitutional issues to the political 
branches, doing so would represent an abdication of the proper role of 
courts and would charge Congress and the executive with responsibilities 
that they are loath to bear. The only other alternative is to revise O’Brien 
doctrine to take the individual’s interest in speech and the availability of 
alternative means of communication seriously. The failure of the Supreme 
Court’s recent efforts to put teeth in O’Brien scrutiny, however, makes it 
unlikely that architectural censorship will be subject to meaningful First 
Amendment review in the foreseeable future. 
I. ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP OF MEDIA CONTENT 
This Part employs economic analysis17 to examine four ways in which 
the current regime of structural regulation can give rise to architectural 
 
 15. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 16. See infra Part II.D. 
 17. Professor Baker spends a significant portion of his commentary criticizing my work for 
taking an economic or “commodity-based” approach to media policy rather than framing the issues in 
terms of democracy. See Baker, supra note 13, at 742–747. I have offered two basic criticisms of 
attempts to base media regulation on democratic principles elsewhere and will only sketch my 
conclusions here. First, by valuing speech for its contributions to democracy, these theories adopt a 
consequentialist approach that is at odds with the autonomy-centered vision that has long dominated 
free speech theory. Second, the existing democracy-centered theories are too insufficiently theorized to 
yield a workable system of media regulation. These theories recognize that their Jeffersonian vision of 
small speakers might have to yield to other considerations (including economics), yet fail to provide a 
coherent framework for determining how to balance these countervailing considerations. In this respect, 
it is telling that such luminaries as Lillian Bevier, Vincent Blasi, Robert Bork, Cass Sunstein, Owen 
Fiss, and Harry Kalven have each advanced theories of media regulation that began from similar, 
democracy-based premises, and yet have implemented their theories by drawing radically different 
conclusions. Yoo, supra note 11, at 306–46. See also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A 
Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1953–62 (2000). In this respect, the debate between 
economic and democratic visions of media policy parallels a similar debate in antitrust. In that case, the 
populist approach to antitrust failed in no small part because of its inability to offer a basis for resolving 
the trade-offs between competing considerations. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality 
pt. II.E.2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Professor Baker appears to recognize the 
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censorship. Although most of the features of the current regime were not 
always created out of a desire to affect media content, they nonetheless 
have precisely that effect. 
A. THE PREFERENCE FOR FREE RADIO AND TELEVISION 
The desire to promote free (advertising-supported18) radio and 
television over pay versions of the same media has long represented one of 
the central tenets of U.S. media policy.19 Policymakers have exhibited 
hostility toward radio services that were provided on a fee basis since the 
earliest days of radio regulation. This hostility is reflected in the FCC’s 
longstanding hostility toward subscription-based radio technologies,20 
discernible most recently in its resistance to satellite radio—known 
technically as Digital Audio Radio Services (“DARS”)—such as XM and 
Sirius.21 
 
problem, and indeed his work on “complex democracy” is among the most promising in the field. See 
Baker, supra note 11, at 143–47. Even his laudable efforts fall short of articulating a basis sufficient to 
make difficult trade-offs inherent in any system of media regulation. 
 18. As I have noted elsewhere, the term “free” is something of a misnomer. “Free” radio and 
television is only possible because the broadcast industry receives hundreds of billions of dollars worth 
of spectrum for free. Indeed, the industry members are the only significant commercial users of 
spectrum that do not have to pay for their frequencies. The commitment of these resources inevitably 
increases the cost of all other spectrum-based technologies. As a result, the public bears the costs of 
“free” radio and television by paying higher fees for cellular telephony and other spectrum-based 
technologies. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 1579, 1712–14 (2003). 
 19. The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis appearing in Yoo, supra 
note 18, at 1668–82. For other related analyses that draw somewhat different policy conclusions, see 
BAKER, supra note 11, at 24–40; Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 
7 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1964); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic 
Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q.J. ECON. 103, 118–19 (1977). 
 20. See KMLA Broad. Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 41 
(C.D. Cal. 1967). See generally Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional 
“Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage”, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052–57 (1997) (detailing the 
hostility toward subscription radio services historically exhibited by the FCC and its predecessor 
agency, the Federal Radio Commission). One of the few early exceptions was the transmission of 
background music pioneered by the Muzak Corp., which the FCC allowed to be provided on a 
subscription basis. See Muzak Corp., 8 F.C.C. 581, 582 (1941). Even then, such subscription services 
are generally heavily restricted. See KMLA Broad. Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 37–38 (describing how the 
FCC required radio stations to provide background music services solely via subcarrier frequencies and 
mandated that those services not interfere with the main-channel transmissions that are available for 
free to the entire listening public). 
 21. See Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local: A Response to 
Christopher Yoo’s Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J. 233, 248–52 (2004) (detailing the 
manner in which FCC regulations have hampered DARS). 
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The hostility toward subscription media services is also manifest in 
U.S. television policy.22 When the development of scrambling technology 
made subscription television feasible, the FCC acted fairly quickly to stifle 
the industry’s growth.23 The bias against pay television services was even 
more evident in the FCC’s policies toward cable television, most 
particularly in the relentless campaign to require local cable operators to 
provide free carriage to all full-power broadcast stations operating in their 
service area (commonly known as “must-carry”).24 The desire to foster free 
 
 22. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1669–75. 
 23. The FCC declined to authorize subscription television as a general service and instead, the 
FCC merely authorized it on an experimental basis. Amendment of Part 3 of the Commission’s Rules 
and Regulations (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service, Third 
Report, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959). When the FCC eventually authorized more widespread deployment in 
1968, it saddled the technology with a host of restrictions. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 
Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. 
FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It was only after the D.C. Circuit’s adverse decision in Home Box 
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28–51 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), that the FCC relented and lifted 
the restrictions on subscription television. See Repeal of Programming Restrictions on Subscription 
Television, Report and Order, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,322 (F.C.C. Apr. 7, 1978); Amendment of Part 73 of the 
Commission’s Rules and Regulations in Regard to Section 73.642(a)(3) and Other Aspects of the 
Subscription Television Service, Third Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982). 
 24. The FCC foreshadowed the imposition of must-carry in the very first decision in which it 
asserted jurisdiction over cable systems. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 
(1962), aff’d, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The FCC later imposed must-carry on cable systems 
receiving programming through microwave transmission, see Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to 
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for 
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and 
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 705 ¶ 57, 716–17 ¶¶ 85–90 (1965) [hereinafter CATV First Report and Order], 
and extended must-carry to systems that retransmitted over-the-air television broadcasts, Amendment of 
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the 
Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna 
Systems, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 746 ¶¶ 48–49, 752–53 ¶ 66 (1966) [hereinafter 
CATV Second Report and Order] (extending the same rules to all cable systems). See also Amendment 
of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna 
Television Systems, Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 170–71 ¶ 74, 173–76 ¶¶ 78–
87 (1972) (reaffirming must-carry); Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (F.C.C. May 2, 1985) (final rule) (same). 
The FCC justified must-carry in large part by a desire to prevent those who are unable or 
unwilling to pay for television service from being deprived of it. See Cable Television Syndicated 
Program Exclusivity Rules, Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 744 ¶ 185 (1980), aff’d sub nom. 
Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981); CATV Second Report and Order, supra, at 
788–89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report and Order, supra, at 699 ¶ 44, 700 ¶ 48(1). 
Eventually, congressional intervention was necessary before must-carry could withstand judicial 
review. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
§§ 4–5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471–81 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (2000)). The must-
carry statute would eventually be sustained by the Supreme Court as a valid means to further the 
government’s interest in “preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television.” Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) [hereinafter “Turner II”]. 
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television is apparent in the steps taken to regulate direct broadcast satellite 
(“DBS”) systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish Network,25 and underlies 
the FCC’s decision to deploy digital television through broadcasters rather 
than through cable and satellite providers.26 
Historically, efforts by Congress and the FCC to promote free radio 
and television have not been driven by content-based motivations. Instead, 
they are the result of a desire to preserve access for households that cannot 
afford subscription services.27 Although these goals are quite laudable, 
application of economic analysis reveals that fostering advertising-
supported radio and television has had a hidden, deleterious effect on the 
quantity, quality, and diversity of programming provided. 
 
 25. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101 (1999) (noting that the Satellite Home Viewer 
Improvement Act was “intended to preserve free television for those not served by satellite or cable 
systems”); S. REP. NO. 106–51, at 1 (1999) (recognizing that the purpose of the legislation was 
“protecting the availability of free, local over-the-air television”); id. at 13 (finding that “maintaining 
free over-the-air-television is a preeminent public interest” and identifying “protecting the viability of 
free, local, over-the-air television” as one of the statute’s purposes); H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5655 (expressing the concern that, if unregulated, 
satellite television would “undermine the base of free local television service upon which the American 
people continue to rely”). 
 26. The FCC has repeatedly justified the importance of deploying digital television through 
broadcasting rather than other television services on the grounds that broadcasting, unlike subscription 
services, represents a “free” service that is available to almost all U.S. households. See Advanced 
Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and 
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,811–12 ¶ 5, 12,820 ¶¶ 27–29 (1997); Advanced Television Systems and 
Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 6235, 6249 ¶ 36 (1996); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon 
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342 ¶ 4 (1992); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the 
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 
6520, 6525 ¶¶ 38–39 (1988). See also Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the 
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fourth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,787–88 ¶ 33 
(1996) (noting that the goals of digital television deployment include preserving a free, universal 
broadcasting service); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television 
Broadcast Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶ 6, 10,543 ¶ 22 (1995) (same). Concerns 
about preserving free television have also animated the FCC’s proceedings regarding the extension of 
the must-carry rules to digital programming. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2600 ¶ 3, 2648 ¶ 113 
(2001); Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,114–15 ¶ 43 (1998). 
 27. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (finding a “substantial government interest in promoting the 
continued availability of such free television programming, especially for viewers who are unable to 
afford other means of receiving programming”); Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190 (relying on the need to 
preserve free television to uphold must-carry). 
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1. Impact on the Quantity of Television Produced 
Reliance on advertising support is likely to lead to a systematic 
underfinancing of media programming. When broadcasters derive revenue 
solely from advertising, one would expect the total revenue to be 
determined by viewers’ and listeners’ responsiveness to the advertising 
contained within programs. In other words, advertisers will increase their 
spending so long as the revenue generated by exposing audiences to an 
additional commercial exceeds the cost of purchasing an additional 
commercial. 
Although it is possible that audiences’ responsiveness to advertising 
might yield the same net revenue as direct payments for the underlying 
programs, there is no theoretical reason to expect that these levels would be 
the same.28 In fact, the available empirical evidence indicates that 
advertisers place a significantly lower value on programming than viewers 
and listeners. One oft-cited study conducted in the 1970s estimated that 
viewers were willing to pay seven times more for television programming 
than were advertisers.29 A pair of recent event studies confirmed those 
results by showing that television programs financed by pay-per-view 
generate significantly greater revenue than programs financed by 
advertising support.30 
 
 28. See Minasian, supra note 19, at 74–75. See also Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 104–05. 
 29. See ROGER G. NOLL, MERTON J. PECK & JOHN J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
TELEVISION REGULATION 23 (1973). See also Harvey J. Levin, Program Duplication, Diversity, and 
Effective Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 81, 82, 88 (1971) (concluding 
that entry by pay television supported more informational programming and other special interest 
programming than would advertising-supported television); Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 118–19 
(drawing on the Noll-Peck-McGowan data to show that reliance on advertising support was suppressing 
the emergence of a fourth television network). Although other economists have quibbled with the 
precise size of this disparity, they do not dispute the fundamental conclusion that consumers are willing 
to pay far more for television than advertisers. See Stanley M. Besen & Bridger M. Mitchell, Noll, Peck, 
and McGowan’s Economic Aspects of Television Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 301, 
308–11 (1974) (book review); Bryan Ellickson, Hedonic Theory and the Demand for Cable Television, 
69 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 188–89 (1979). 
 30. See Claus Thustrup Hansen & Søren Kyhl, Pay-Per-View Broadcasting of Outstanding 
Events: Consequences of a Ban, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 589, 590, 601, 604 (2001); Steinar Holden, 
Network or Pay-Per-View?: A Welfare Analysis, 43 ECON. LETTERS 59, 62–64 (1993). It is interesting 
to note that these two studies drew different normative implications from the same empirical findings. 
The difference results from the fact that the Hansen and Kyhl study employed the generally accepted 
welfare metric of total surplus, while the Holden study focused solely on consumer surplus. This 
disagreement over the proper welfare metric should not obscure the conclusion drawn by both studies 
that a shift to pay television would cause the total revenue captured by the programmer to increase and 
would make possible programming that would not exist if advertising support were the sole source of 
revenue. 
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These studies indicate that advertising support drastically understates 
the intensity of consumers’ preferences for television and radio 
programming and that reliance on advertising support causes revenue to 
drop far below efficient levels. Put another way, favoring advertising 
support over direct payments systematically starves programming of 
resources. Programmers would be able to generate substantially greater 
revenues (and thus devote greater resources to production) if they were 
allowed to charge directly for programs.31 Preventing them from doing so 
has the effect of reducing the total amount of television and radio 
programming produced. 
The policy commitment to foster advertising-supported television has 
also had the indirect effect of hindering the development of multichannel 
television technologies.32 This preference was implicit in the regulations 
requiring cable and satellite television providers to carry all full-power 
local broadcast stations.33 The bias against multichannel technologies was 
made explicit during proceedings to determine how to deploy digital 
television.34 The unfortunate result of this bias against new, multichannel 
technologies is a restriction on the amount of channel capacity available in 
any local market.35 As we shall see, limitations on channel capacity play a 
 
 31. I do not mean to suggest that advertising support should be banned, but rather that television 
and radio providers should be allowed to rely on subscription fees or advertising as they see fit. I would 
not expect the market to rely exclusively on either form of financing. On the contrary, the most likely 
result would be a mix of networks, some relying solely on advertising, some relying solely on direct 
viewer payments, and some relying on a combination of the two, resembling the current market for 
newspapers in many cities. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1682. 
 32. See id. at 1703. 
 33. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 34. The initial regulations encouraged digital broadcasters to transmit a single stream of high 
definition television rather than multiple streams of standard definition television. Advanced Television 
Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast Service, First Report and Order, 5 
F.C.C.R. 5627, 5627 ¶ 1, 5629 ¶ 12 (1990). 
 35. This effect is the most dramatic with respect to the local carriage obligation imposed on 
satellite television services, such as DBS. By its nature, DBS provides service on a national scale. As a 
result, DBS providers who wish to offer programming from the major broadcast networks (namely, 
ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) in Nashville must necessarily transmit that programming to the entire 
country even though no one outside of Nashville would be legally allowed to receive those signals. 
Although the DBS providers are in the process of deploying “spot beam” technology that should allow 
them to restrict the geographic coverage of particular channels, such technologies are not likely to be 
operational for several years. Requiring DBS providers to carry all local stations in any market in which 
they would like to provide local service forces them to dedicate large amounts of their limited channel 
capacity to transmitting redundant signals that only a small portion of the country can legally receive. 
This has the inevitable effect of reducing the number of channels that viewers in any particular city can 
receive. 
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critical role in causing media markets to underproduce programming that 
appeals to relatively small audience segments.36 
2. Impact on the Quality and the Diversity of Programming 
Reliance on advertising also reduces program quality and diversity. 
Limiting programs’ ability to generate revenue necessarily increases the 
minimum audience size needed for a program to break even. This in turn 
has the inevitable effect of skewing the market against programming that 
appeals only to a relatively small segment of the audience.37 
Conventional markets provide a straightforward mechanism for 
encouraging the production of low-volume products that enrich the product 
mix, as evidenced by the survival of high-priced boutiques in a world 
increasingly dominated by mass-market discounters. So long as consumers 
who prefer those low-volume products are willing and able to pay more for 
them, the total revenue generated will be sufficient to cover costs, even if 
those costs are substantially higher. Stated more formally, low-volume 
products can exist so long as consumers can use prices to signal the 
intensity of their preferences. 
Advertising support effectively forecloses viewers and listeners from 
using prices to signal the intensity of their preferences. Simply put, 
advertising support provides viewers and listeners with only a single degree 
of freedom with which to signal the intensity of their preferences. They can 
either choose to view the programming offered by the network, in which 
case the network derives revenue equivalent to that type of viewer’s 
responsiveness to advertising, or they can choose not to watch, in which 
case the network receives nothing. This limits viewers to an all-or-nothing 
signal of their preferences.38 It makes revenue largely a function of 
audience size,39 thereby preventing small audiences from obtaining the 
programming they want no matter how much they are willing to pay for it. 
The recent financial and critical success of HBO provides an eloquent 
demonstration of these dynamics. Viewers’ ability to signal intensity of 
 
 36. See infra notes 102, 109, 125–127 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 112. 
 38. This distortion is analogous to the problem endemic in many election schemes, in which 
voters simply vote “yes” or “no” for a particular candidate without being able to signal the intensity of 
their preferences. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2000); Saul 
Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 208–09 (1997) (collecting empirical research confirming 
the “direct correlation [between] size in audience and station [advertising] revenues” (alterations in 
original and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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preference through direct payments allows HBO to generate more than half 
the revenue of CBS even though its prime time audience is almost fifteen 
times smaller.40 In other words, HBO is able to generate roughly eight 
times more revenue per viewer than CBS. This makes it far easier for HBO 
to produce programs that appeal to relatively small audiences. In addition, 
to the extent that program quality is correlated with the amount spent 
producing each program, a shift to subscription services also causes 
program quality to improve. Indeed, HBO’s dominance of recent Emmy 
Awards provides a powerful demonstration of this effect.41 
Reliance on advertising support has the inevitable effect of excluding 
programming that appeals only to small audiences, regardless of both the 
strength of viewers’ and listeners’ preferences and their willingness to pay. 
Reliance on advertising support thus tends to reduce the diversity of the 
programming mix by preventing the survival of economically viable 
programs that appeal only to small audiences.42 Indeed, recent empirical 
studies focusing on black and Hispanic audiences, who represent precisely 
the type of small audiences with nonmainstream preferences that 
advertising support tends to disfavor, indicate they are in fact underserved 
in precisely the manner that this theory predicts.43 
Conversely, allowing direct payments for preferred programming 
would make it far easier for programming strongly desired by a small 
portion of the audience to appear. To use a somewhat fanciful example, 
suppose that there is a small group of ten thousand opera lovers who each 
would be willing to pay up to $1000 to view the entire season of the New 
York Metropolitan Opera on television.44 If these opera lovers were able to 
make direct payments to the television network, they would be able to offer 
 
 40. See John M. Higgins, Still Strutting after All These Years: Although NBC Remains No. 1, 
CBS Is Close Behind, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 20, 21, 24 (reporting that CBS had 
2004 revenue of $4.45 billion with an average audience of 13.3 million, while HBO had 2004 revenue 
of $2.4 billion with an average audience of 893,000). 
 41. See Mike Duffy, Sunday Belongs to HBO: Cable Network Is the Emmy Powerhouse to Beat, 
DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 21, 2003, at 1E; Bernard Weinraub, HBO Is Big Winner at Emmy Awards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at A22; 
 42. See Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 113; SIMON P. ANDERSON & STEPHEN COATE, 
MARKET PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE OF BROADCASTING 23–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7513, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513. 
 43. Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externalities, Minority 
Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, 10 ADVERTISING & DIFFERENTIATED 
PRODUCTS 73, 80–83 (Michael R. Baye & Jon P. Nelson eds., 2001); Joel Waldfogel, Preference 
Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benefits Whom in Differentiated-Product Markets, 34 RAND 
J. ECON. 557 (2003). 
 44. For those with different tastes, the example applies equally well to a small group of loyal 
fans of a team located in a different city. 
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a total of $10 million to a station willing to provide such programming, in 
which case the programming might well appear. If the network offering 
this programming were forced to rely solely on advertising support, the 
amount of revenue that such a program would capture would be limited by 
the amount of advertised products that this relatively small group of opera 
lovers would be willing to buy. In this case, the revenue generated by 
advertising support would likely be only a fraction of that generated by 
direct payments.45 
3. Distortions Resulting from Allowing Advertisers to Serve as 
Intermediaries 
Reliance on advertising support introduces additional market 
distortions by allowing advertisers to serves as intermediaries in the 
relationship between audiences and program producers. Although reliance 
on advertising support tends to make the impact of any particular audience 
member more uniform than would be possible under a system of direct 
payments, the fact that individuals with certain demographic characteristics 
are likely to be more responsive to advertising inevitably makes some 
audience members more valuable to advertisers than others.46 
This, in turn, can skew the markets away from an audience’s true 
preferences. For example, reliance on advertising support encourages 
television and radio programmers to be consumerist in focus and tends to 
make them excessively sensitive to the preferences of those demographic 
groups that are the most responsive to advertising.47 Consequently, it tends 
 
 45. Professor Baker chides me for ignoring externalities. See Baker, supra note 13, at 749. This 
criticism is in tension with one of the central economic lessons of the past half-century, which is that, so 
long as transaction costs are low, markets are far more effective at dealing with externalities than 
previously thought. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For my 
analysis of the implications of externalities and transaction costs on media ownership policy, see 
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON 
REG. 171, 193–200, 213–17, 232–37 (2002). To the extent that the relevant externalities are positive 
externalities enjoyed by audiences, however, the collective action problems created by the large number 
of people involved may cause markets to fail. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Coasean Critique 
of Broadcast Regulation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Even if transaction costs 
prevent markets from fully internalizing the extant externalities, the classic solution would be subsidies 
(or perhaps liability rules) rather than ownership restrictions. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 192–94 (4th ed. 1932) (subsidies); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (liability 
rules). 
 46. See Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan & David S. Evans, The Audience-Revenue 
Relationship for Local Television Stations, 11 BELL J. ECON. 694 (1980). 
 47. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 26; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
FREE SPEECH 71 (1993). 
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to bias the market against programming preferred by those who are the 
least responsive to advertising. For example, one would expect that reliance 
on advertising support would tend to lead to a systematic underproduction 
of children’s educational television, since purchasing decisions are 
typically made by supervising parents whose responsiveness to the 
commercials contained in children’s programming is constrained by the 
fact that they frequently do not see the commercials at all.48 Allowing 
parents to make direct payments for programming would provide a much 
more straightforward means for signaling their preferences. It is almost 
certainly no accident that most of the best children’s educational 
programming on commercial television appears on cable.49 
Reliance on advertising support also allows the biases of particular 
advertisers to influence the program mix. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some advertisers have discouraged networks from offering programming 
that addresses controversial issues or that casts their products in a poor 
light.50 This reliance also leaves programmers vulnerable to the political 
biases of advertisers and special interest groups. Consider, for example, the 
recent controversy surrounding the miniseries The Reagans, originally 
scheduled to air on CBS. When dissatisfaction with the portrayal of the 
former President and First Lady threatened to erupt into a consumer 
boycott of any products advertised during the miniseries, Viacom shifted 
the program from CBS to Showtime, a premium movie channel that does 
not depend on advertising support.51 
This episode bears a striking resemblance to the reaction to a pair of 
programs on abortion aired during the 1970s. When NBC tried to broadcast 
its movie version of Roe v. Wade, it faced such a backlash from advertisers 
that it eventually opted to show the movie without commercials, which in 
turn caused it to incur significant economic losses on the project.52 This is 
in sharp contrast to the relative ease with which HBO was able to air a 
documentary on the same subject. The fundamental difference is that 
HBO’s survival does not depend on its ability to assuage sponsors. As one 
 
 48. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 
11 F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,675 ¶¶ 32–33 (1996). 
 49. See Yoo, supra note 11, at 327–28. 
 50. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 24–30; SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 63–65; Steven Shiffrin, 
The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 696–713 (1994). 
 51. See Meg James, Greg Braxton & Bob Baker, The Vetoing of “Reagans”: How Protests and 
Bad Timing Led CBS to Cancel a Movie About the Former First Couple, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 
E1; Emily Nelson & Joe Flint, CBS Pulls “Reagans” amid Opposition from Conservatives, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3. 
 52. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 65; Shiffrin, supra note 50, at 698. 
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HBO executive explained, “We’re not any braver than the networks. It’s 
just that our economic basis is different.”53 
It is thus clear that the FCC’s historical commitment to promoting a 
radio and television industry supported by advertising represents a form of 
architectural censorship that has had the unintended consequence of 
reducing the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of radio and television 
programming. Although a number of other scholars recognizing the 
problems associated with advertising support have proposed second-order 
corrective measures,54 I would prefer the more straightforward solution of 
eliminating the hostility toward fee-based services. Advertising-supported 
media would appear to be a singularly inefficient mechanism for ensuring 
that all U.S. households have access to media regardless of their 
socioeconomic status. The evidence suggests that a targeted subsidy 
system, in which households falling below the poverty line are given 
discounted service, would be far more effective than the current system of 
untargeted subsidies.55 
Recent pronouncements by Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
FCC, however, make it quite likely that the commitment to preserving free 
television will remain one of the central aims of U.S. media policy for the 
foreseeable future.56 As long as that is the case, this policy will continue to 
have unintended and adverse impacts on the content of speech. 
B. RATE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 
Another common feature of U.S. media policy has been the imposition 
of rate regulation on the cable television industry.57 These efforts were 
clearly designed to protect consumers against excessive prices charged by 
 
 53. Jan Hoffman, TV Shouts “Baby” (and Barely Whispers “Abortion”), N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
1992, at H1, quoted in Shiffrin, supra note 50, at 698. 
 54. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 98–99, 114–21; SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 84–88. 
 55. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1675–76; Yoo, supra note 11, at 354–55. 
 56. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534–535 (2000)); Turner I, 
512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (recognizing that “nearly 40% of American households still rely on broadcast 
stations as their exclusive source of television programming” and holding that “protecting noncable 
households from loss of regular television broadcasting service” is an important federal interest 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,674–75 ¶ 148 
(identifying “the preservation of free, universally available local broadcast television in a digital world” 
as an important goal). 
 57. For a useful overview of the early history of cable rate regulation, see Time Warner 
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 178–80 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (opinion of Randolph, J.). 
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local cable monopolists.58 Because of its economic focus and its 
unrelatedness to program content, rate regulation represents a classic 
example of structural regulation. As a result, conventional wisdom 
presumes that rate regulation has little to no impact on the content of 
speech.59 
The on-again/off-again history of cable rate regulation60 provides an 
ideal opportunity for using event studies to assess its effectiveness 
empirically. Somewhat surprisingly, these studies indicate that rate 
regulation has largely been a failure. Despite the fact that rate regulation 
was designed to protect consumers against excessive prices charged by 
cable operators who did not face effective competition, the evidence 
suggests that rate regulation failed to yield any real welfare benefits for 
consumers.61 
The key to understanding why rate regulation proved to be such a 
disappointment is to acknowledge the regime’s inherent limitations. Rate 
regulation has always worked best when applied to commodity services, in 
which the quality and type of service provided does not vary. The would-be 
monopolist has only one dimension—price—with which it can extract 
surplus from consumers. When that is the case, limiting the prices that 
monopolists charge may well prove effective in limiting the exercise of 
market power. 
A different situation obtains when the regulated service is not a 
commodity.62 Where products vary in terms of quality, price represents 
 
 58. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (2000); Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 184–85. 
 59. See Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 183. 
 60. Rate regulation was widely imposed by cities until 1984, at which point it was effectively 
abolished by Congress. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, sec. 
623(b), 98 Stat. 2779, 2788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (allowing rate 
regulation unless cable operators faced “effective competition”); Implementation of the Provisions of 
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648–50 ¶¶ 91–100 (F.C.C. 
May 2, 1985) (final rule) (defining “effective competition” in a way that exempted 96% of all cable 
systems). Congress reinstated cities’ authority to regulate cable rates in 1992. See Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1464. 
It abruptly changed course once again four years later by passing another statute largely deregulating 
cable rates. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 301(b), 110 Stat. 56, 114–15. 
 61. See generally THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD 
CABLE TELEVISION (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on Household 
Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422 (2000). 
 62. See generally David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and 
Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies, 102 Q.J. ECON. 743 (1987); David Besanko, Shabtai 
Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, The Multiproduct Firm, Quality Choice, and Regulation, 36 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 411 (1988); Kenneth S. Corts, Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on 
Pricing and Bundling, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 377 (1995). 
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only one of several dimensions along which producers can appeal to 
customers. Unless the regulator imposes comprehensive controls over 
quality as well as price, the regulated entity may evade any price 
restrictions simply by degrading the quality of its product offerings. 
Indeed, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that this is precisely 
what has occurred in the cable industry. Although rate regulation caused 
nominal cable prices to drop, once other characteristics—such as the total 
number and quality of channels offered—are taken into account, the 
empirical evidence indicates that rate regulation caused quality-adjusted 
rates to increase and that deregulation caused quality-adjusted rates to 
fall.63 This implies that consumers would have preferred larger, higher 
quality bundles of channels than they received under rate regulation, even 
if acquiring them meant paying higher prices. Placing a cap on cable rates 
simply limited cable operators’ ability to move their product packages 
closer to consumers’ ideal preferences.64 
It thus appears that rate regulation did little to prevent local cable 
operators from exercising whatever monopoly power they possessed. 
Instead, rate regulation had the unintended consequence of degrading the 
quality of existing cable offerings and foreclosing the emergence of higher 
quality channel packages despite viewers’ willingness to pay for them.65 
 
 63. See HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 61, at 2, 69–177, 208; Crawford, supra note 61, at 444–
45. 
 64. Cable operators wishing to add high-end programming did have another option. They could 
have purchased it on an à la carte/premium channel basis. Forcing cable operators, however, to offer 
such channels on a stand-alone basis can have a dramatic impact. It prevents the operator from 
obtaining the benefits of bundling, which in turn makes it possible for the cable operator to offer a 
wider range of programming. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1706–12. 
 65. Baker argues that distributive concerns, particularly the need to preserve access to the media 
by the poor, might justify cable rate regulation. See Baker, supra note 13, at 748. As is typical of 
economic analyses, my argument is not focused on distribution. That said, Baker’s position is somewhat 
inconsistent with the basic structure of media policy. As noted earlier, preserving access to television by 
all citizens represents one of the central commitments of U.S. policy with respect to broadcasting. See 
supra notes 17–22, 25 and accompanying text. Broadcast stations remain the only commercial users 
who are not required to pay for their spectrum. The justification for what some Senators have 
condemned as an unsupportable act of corporate welfare is the need to preserve access to television. 
Yoo, supra note 18, at 1673–74, 1700. Conservative estimates place the value of this spectrum 
giveaway at $450 billion. See Hazlett, supra note 21, at 252 & n.44. The need to preserve access to 
broadcast television also represented one of the central justifications for must-carry. See supra notes 23, 
26 and accompanying text. Having already set aside broadcasting as the medium for ensuring universal 
access to television and after having committed so many resources to ensure that it is available to 
everyone, regulating cable to accomplish the same end would seem excessive. Even if that were the 
goal, it is quite likely that direct subsidies would represent a far more effective means for promoting 
indigent access to cable television. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1675–76; Yoo, supra note 11, at 354–55. 
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C. RESTRICTIONS ON HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION 
The FCC has long restricted the number of media outlets that one 
entity can own in any local media market. Some rules focus on intramedia 
crossownership. They originated as a preference in licensing hearings 
against holding licenses to two AM radio stations operating in the same 
city.66 The FCC formalized this licensing preference in a “duopoly rule” 
promulgated in 1940, which explicitly prohibited anyone from holding 
licenses for two television stations or two FM radio stations that served 
substantially the same area.67 The duopoly rule was extended to AM radio 
in 1943.68 
Other restrictions focus on intermedia crossownership. Like the 
intramedia crossownership restrictions, intermedia crossownership 
restrictions began in licensing hearings as a preference in favor of 
diversification of media ownership.69 In the 1970s, the FCC formalized 
these preferences into a series of explicit intermedia crossownership 
restrictions. The principal intermedia crossownership restrictions included 
(1) the “one-to-a-market” rule, which prohibited combined ownership of a 
radio and television station in the same local market;70 (2) the 
 
 66. See Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186–87 (1938). 
 67. See 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1940). 
 68. See Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065 (F.C.C. Nov. 27, 
1943). The FCC tightened the duopoly rule in 1969, abolishing the more permissive standard that only 
prohibited joint ownership if the stations served “substantially the same area” in favor of a more 
stringent restriction forbidding joint ownership of radio stations that had any overlap in their primary 
service contours, no matter how small. The rule was even more restrictive for television, which 
prohibited joint ownership of stations whenever there was any overlap in their secondary service 
contours. See Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1728 (1964). 
 69. See, e.g., Port Huron Broad. Co., 5 F.C.C. 177, 182 (1938); Newspaper Ownership of Radio 
Stations, 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (F.C.C. Jan. 18, 1944) (notice of dismissal of proceeding). See generally 
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394–95 (1965) (identifying 
“[d]iversification of control of the media of mass communications” as a “factor of primary 
significance” in comparative licensing proceedings) (italics omitted). The FCC’s early application of 
this criterion was far from consistent. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 64–69 (1962); Bernard Schwartz, 
Comparative Television and the Chancellor’s Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 673–78, 685–94 (1959). 
 70. See Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, First Report and Order, 22 
F.C.C.2d 306, 308 ¶ 8 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Multiple Ownership Order]. Shortly thereafter, the FCC 
liberalized the one-to-a-market rule to permit AM-FM combinations in the same market and to allow 
existing radio licensees to acquire UHF stations in the same market. See Amendment of Sections 73.35, 
73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and 
Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971). 
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newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule, which banned common 
ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station when the broadcast 
station’s service contour completely encompassed the newspaper’s city of 
publication;71 (3) the cable/broadcast crossownership rule, which 
effectively prohibited the owner of a local cable system from also owning a 
local broadcast station;72 and (4) the cable/local telephone company 
crossownership rule, which prohibited local telephone companies from 
providing video programming to subscribers in their respective local 
service area.74 
The FCC has long justified its restrictions on horizontal concentration 
with two rationales: the need to protect competition75 and the need to 
promote a diversity of programming and viewpoints.76 The first is 
completely economic in focus and unrelated to the content of speech. The 
second implicates First Amendment concerns more directly because 
 
 71. See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating 
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 
50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Multiple Ownership Order]. 
 72. As a formal matter, this rule only prohibits a cable television system from carrying the signal 
of any broadcast television station if it owns a broadcast station in the same local market. Amendment 
of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna 
Television Systems, Second Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 816, 820–21 689 ¶ 12–14 (1970) 
[hereinafter Community Antenna Order]. When combined with the cable operators’ must-carry 
obligations, this rule effectively prohibits cable/broadcast crossownership. See Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 74. Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities 
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 
307, 323–25 ¶¶ 43–49 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 
846 (5th Cir. 1971). This requirement was codified by the 1984 Cable Act. See Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, sec. 613(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (originally codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 533(b)). 
 75. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast Multiple 
Ownership Rules, First Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1723, 1724 ¶ 8, 1727 ¶¶ 32–33 (1989) [hereinafter 
1989 Multiple Ownership Order]; 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1074 ¶ 99; 1970 
Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 70, at 307 ¶ 3 ; Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 
73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television 
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476–77 ¶¶ 2–3 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 
Multiple Ownership Order]; Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186–87 (1938). 
 76. See, e.g., Genesee, 5 F.C.C. at 186–87; 1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at 
1723–24 ¶ 7, 1727 ¶ 31; 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1074 ¶ 99; 1970 Multiple 
Ownership Order, supra note 70, at 307 ¶ 3; 1964 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at 1476–
77 ¶¶ 2–3. 
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“ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the 
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation.”77 
Several forces led the FCC to relax a number of these rules in the 
ensuing years. The first was a series of deregulatory initiatives launched 
during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.78 
Furthermore, a series of lower federal court decisions handed down during 
the mid-1990s voided the cable/local telephone company crossownership 
rule on First Amendment grounds.79 The issue had already been briefed and 
argued before the Supreme Court when it was rendered moot by a 
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that eliminated the 
rule.80 
 
 77. 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1050 ¶ 14. 
 78. In 1989, the FCC relaxed the duopoly rule. Under the old rule, common ownership of two 
broadcast stations in the same service was prohibited if there was any overlap in the two stations’ 
primary service contours. Under the new rule, same-service common ownership would be prohibited 
only if the two stations’ principal city contours overlapped. 1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 
75, at 1723. The next day, the FCC relaxed the one-to-a-market rule to allow for a presumptive waiver 
for failed stations and for crossownership in the top twenty-five markets so long as thirty independent 
voices remain in the market. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast 
Multiple Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1741 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Second 
Multiple Ownership Order]. In 1992, the FCC repealed the network/cable crossownership rule. 
Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.501 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations to 
Eliminate the Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Television 
Networks, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 6156, 6162–63 ¶ 10 (1992) [hereinafter Order to Eliminate the 
Prohibition on Common Ownership]. The FCC also relaxed the duopoly rule with respect to radio, 
allowing a single entity to own two AM and two FM stations in the same market so long as the market 
contained fifteen or more commercial stations and so long as the radio combinations did not exceed a 
designated audience share. In smaller markets, the 1992 amendments permitted a single entity to own 
three radio stations, no more than two of which could be in the same service. Revision of Radio Rules 
and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757–61 ¶¶ 4–12 (1992) [hereinafter Radio Rules and 
Policies]. The FCC also initiated proceedings to revisit the rules with respect to television. See 
Broadcast Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 6,490 (F.C.C. Feb. 2, 1995) (further notice of proposed rulemaking). 
Television Broadcast Services; Video Marketplace, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,163 (F.C.C. June 24, 1992) (notice 
of proposed rulemaking); Broadcast and Cable Services, Effect of Changes in the Video Marketplace, 
56 Fed. Reg. 40,847 (F.C.C. Aug. 16, 1991) (notice of inquiry). 
 79. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 516 
U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), 
vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 
1995); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. 
United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. 93-323-P-C, 
1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994). See generally Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition: 
Dances with Regulators, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1016, 1018–24 (1997) (reviewing these cases). 
 80. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124 
(repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)). 
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The 1996 Act also contained a number of provisions raising the 
thresholds needed to trigger various horizontal ownership restrictions.81 In 
addition, Congress directed the FCC to create a biennial review process in 
which it would revisit all of its ownership rules every two years to 
“determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as 
a result of competition” and to “repeal or modify any regulation it 
determines to be no longer in the public interest.”82 The FCC amended a 
number of its rules during its initial biennial review, but left many others in 
place.83 This was followed by a pair of decisions issued by the D.C. Circuit 
in 2002 striking down the FCC’s refusal to revisit the cable/broadcast 
crossownership84 and the revised duopoly rules.85 
Judicial invalidation of these ownership restrictions prompted the FCC 
to undertake a massive reassessment of the regulations as part of its 2002 
biennial review proceeding. Rejecting calls for repeal of most of its 
ownership rules, the FCC instead replaced the hodgepodge of local 
ownership rules with a new, integrated approach based on a “diversity 
index” designed to take into account all media when assessing the overall 
 
 81. Specifically, the Act substantially relaxed the one-to-a-market rule with respect to radio. Id. 
§ 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110. It also directed the FCC to conduct a proceeding to determine whether to 
retain, modify, or eliminate the duopoly rule with respect to television. Id. § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111. 
It expanded a presumptive waiver to the radio/television crossownership rule for the top twenty-five 
markets discussed above, supra note 70, to cover the top fifty markets. § 202(d), 110 Stat. at 111. The 
Act also repealed the statutory provision prohibiting cable/telephone company crossownership. Id. 
§ 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 124. It also repealed the provision codifying the cable/broadcast 
crossownership rule. Id. § 202(i), 110 Stat. at 112. Repealing the statutory ban on cable/broadcast 
crossownership left in place the parallel regulatory requirement imposed by the FCC. See Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 82. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111–12. 
 83. Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 64 Fed. Reg. 
50,651 (F.C.C. Sept. 17, 1999) (final rule). Of particular note is the manner in which the FCC relaxed 
the one-to-a-market rule and the duopoly rule for television. In each case, the FCC incorporated an 
“independent voices” test into the rule that allowed a greater degree of crossownership if a sufficient 
number of independent ownership groups remained after the merger. There was one key difference 
between the two independent voices tests devised by the FCC. With respect to the duopoly rules, the 
FCC took an expansive view of what constituted an independent voice, including other media such as 
radio stations, daily newspapers, and local cable systems. Id. at 50,659–60. The Commission took a 
much narrower approach when determining what constituted an independent voice for purposes of the 
one-to-a-market rule, limiting its scope only to other television stations. Id. at 50,655 ¶ 30. 
 84. See Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1049–52. On remand, the FCC declined the 
opportunity to attempt to generate an alternative justification for the rule and instead simply repealed it. 
2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,620. The D.C. Circuit also invalidated the FCC’s 
national television station ownership rule. Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1040–47. As that rule is 
primarily vertical, rather than horizontal, in focus, it is discussed infra notes 172–173 and 
accompanying text. 
 85. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162–65 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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competitiveness of the local market.86 The FCC supplemented the 
traditional concerns of competition and diversity of viewpoints87 with one 
additional policy consideration that was often asserted in connection with 
television and radio policy, but had not previously been invoked with 
respect to horizontal ownership restrictions: localism.88 Interestingly, in 
each instance, the FCC concluded that relaxation of the horizontal 
ownership restrictions would have no adverse impact on the responsiveness 
of media outlets to the needs and interests of their local communities.89 
Unlike vertical integration, which can give national networks the power to 
dictate local programming decisions, horizontal integration has no effect on 
localism, since the locus of programming decisions remains within the 
community.90 In many cases, the record suggested that permitting greater 
horizontal concentration would actually promote localism by allowing 
media outlets to realize the efficiencies associated with crossownership.91 
Shortly after the issuance of the biennial review order, the Third 
Circuit issued a stay preventing it from going into effect pending judicial 
review.92 The court, somewhat remarkably, held that it could ignore the 
traditional requirement that the party seeking the stay demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits—generally regarded as one of the 
standard requirements for the grant of a stay—if the issues were 
sufficiently complex and the hardships sufficiently severe.93 The Third 
Circuit subsequently remanded the changes to the horizontal ownership 
restrictions that would have been effected by the biennial review order.94 
 
 86. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,775–807 ¶¶ 391–481. 
 87. Id. at 13,627–43 ¶¶ 18–72. 
 88. Id. at 13,643–45 ¶¶ 73–79. See also id. at 13,738 ¶ 304 (noting that the FCC had not 
previously emphasized localism as a justification for restricting the number of radio stations one entity 
could own in any one locality). 
 89. See id. at 13,737–38 ¶¶ 302–304, 13,753–54 ¶ 342, 13,772–73 ¶ 383. 
 90. Id. at 13,738 ¶ 304. 
 91. See id. at 13,678–85 ¶¶ 155–169, 13,753–60 ¶¶ 342–354, 13,772–73 ¶¶ 382–385; infra Part 
I.C.2. 
 92. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). 
 93. Id. at *1 (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 
843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
 94. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming the FCC’s power 
to regulate ownership restrictions, but remanding several portions of the order as not sufficiently 
supported by the record). 
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1. The Complex Relationship Between Market Concentration and 
Program Diversity 
There is general agreement that horizontal concentration affects 
program diversity, although theorists differ as to the precise nature of the 
relationship. On the one hand are commentators who are largely critical of 
increases in media concentration and warn that the likely result will be a 
reduction in the quantity and diversity of media content.95 On the other 
hand are scholars who adopt the less intuitive position that increases in 
market concentration can promote program quality and diversity.96 This 
section outlines a more complex approach that captures the nuances of both 
positions. As with most economic issues, the truth lies somewhere in 
between. 
a. Steiner Models 
Reconciliation of these two divergent inferences requires an 
understanding of how it is possible for media monopolies to produce 
greater program diversity than competitive markets. The argument has its 
roots in the model of local radio markets proposed by Peter Steiner,97 
which has subsequently been adapted to the television industry98 and which 
has gained substantial attention from courts,99 commentators,100 and the 
FCC.101 
 
 95. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed. 2000); EDWARD S. HERMAN 
& NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 3–
14 (1988); Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 11; Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 11, at 
832–34, 859–80. 
 96. For my initial review of this literature, see Yoo, supra note 17, at 1935–48. For other 
surveys, see BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 64–100, 141–44 (1992); 
Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304–17 
(1991). 
 97. Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in 
Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952). 
 98. See Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets, 91 
Q.J. ECON. 15 (1977); Jerome Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of TV 
Programming, 4 STUD. PUB. COMM. 45, 47–48 (1962); P. Wiles, Pilkington and the Theory of Value, 
73 ECON. J. 183 (1963). 
 99. See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 100. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 11, at 97 n.278; Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish 
Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 94–95 (2001); Daniel L. Brenner, 
Government Regulation of Radio Program Format Changes, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 56, 63–69 (1978); Jim 
Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. 
L. REV. 1415, 1448, 1491 (1996); Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 11, at 868 & n.366; Spitzer, 
supra note 96, at 305–12. 
 101. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503, 18,530 ¶ 82 & n.159 (2002); Revision of Radio 
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The counterintuitive nature of Steiner’s argument can best be 
understood through a simple numerical example. Steiner assumed that the 
preferences of an audience in a particular local market could be divided 
into four discrete program formats of the following sizes: 
 
FIGURE 1. Steiner’s model of program diversity 
 
 Program format 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Audience size 210 75 50 31 
 
The first station to enter the market would naturally offer 
programming targeted at the largest segment, Type 1. The second entrant 
would face a choice of either offering programming targeted toward the 
second largest segment, Type 2, in which case it would capture an audience 
of 75, or duplicating the same type of programming offered by the first 
entrant, in which case it would split the Type 1 audience with the first 
entrant and capture an audience of 105. So long as half of the largest 
segment exceeds the size of the second largest segment, the second entrant 
will duplicate existing programming format. 
The problem, from a welfare standpoint, is that the entire volume 
captured by the second entrant consists of audience members who were 
already being served by the first (an effect sometimes called “demand 
diversion”). Because the first entrant was already serving these listeners, 
entry by the second station creates no welfare benefits. If the second entrant 
had instead offered Type 2 programming, its audience would have 
consisted entirely of incremental listeners who were not previously being 
served by the incumbent (an effect sometimes called “demand creation”). 
Thus, to the extent that the audience captured by a new entrant results from 
demand creation, entry is welfare enhancing. To the extent that the new 
 
Rules and Policies, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, 7186 ¶ 21 (1994). See 
also 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,740–42 ¶¶ 310–15 (discussing Steiner); Review 
of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Further Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3550–51 ¶¶ 62–63 (1995) (same); Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6 F.C.C.R. 3275 (1991) (same); Reexamination of the Commission’s 
Cross-Interest Policy, Policy Statement, 4 F.C.C.R. 2208, 2212 ¶ 30 (1989) (same); Consideration of 
the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the 
Commission’s Rules, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 894 (1975) (Robinson, Comm’r, 
dissenting) (same). But see 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,742 ¶ 314 (declining to 
embrace Steiner’s model). 
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entrant’s audience results solely from demand diversion, it creates no 
consumer benefits and instead simply wastes resources. 
Steiner recognized that competitive entrants would target their 
programming without taking into account whether the audience it captured 
was the product of demand creation or demand diversion. As a result, they 
may offer redundant programming notwithstanding the fact that doing so 
creates no welfare benefits. In addition, to the extent that channel capacity 
is limited, duplication of existing formats tends to crowd out other program 
types.102 This logic suggests that a third entrant would offer programming 
targeted toward Type 2,103 while a fourth entrant would again duplicate 
Type 1 programming.104 Type 3 programming would not appear until the 
arrival of the sixth station, and Type 4 until the arrival of the tenth.105 
The tendency toward duplication of program types disappears, 
however, if the entrants are jointly owned.106 Unlike a competitive entrant, 
a monopolist would consider whether the revenue captured by an additional 
station resulted from demand creation or from demand diversion. In fact, a 
monopolist controlling all stations would focus solely on generating new 
audiences and would eschew any strategy that simply cannibalized listeners 
from its other stations. 
Stated in the terms of the numerical hypothetical described above, if 
the initial two entrants were jointly owned, the owner would not use both 
stations to target Type 1, since the audience captured by the second station 
would come entirely at the expense of the first. Instead, the owner would 
direct each successive station at a different market segment. Thus, Steiner 
was able to show that, under his assumptions, monopoly control of a local 
radio market can satisfy more viewers and yield greater program diversity 
than can competition.107 
Steiner’s analysis also has implications for program quality. In the 
case of competitive entry, multiple entrants divide the revenue generated by 
any particular program type. In the case of monopolistic control of a local 
radio market, each audience segment is served by precisely one station. 
Therefore, each station under the monopoly solution will capture more 
 
 102. See Beebe, supra note 98, at 23, 30–31; Rothenberg, supra note 98, at 48. 
 103. The third entrant would find that the size of the second largest segment (75) exceeds the 
audience it would capture if it divided the largest segment with the two other entrants (70). 
 104. The fourth entrant would find that one-third of the Type 1 audience (70) would still be larger 
than half of the Type 2 audience (37.5) or the entirety of the Type 3 audience (50). 
 105. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 200. 
 106. See id. at 206–07; Wiles, supra note 98, at 188. 
 107. Steiner, supra note 97, at 206–07. 
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revenue than under competition. To the extent that quality correlates with 
program cost, monopoly provision should cause program quality to 
increase.108 
b. Limitations of Steiner Models 
Steiner models suffer from a number of limitations, some well 
recognized, other less so. Theorists building on Steiner’s work have 
pointed out that the correlation between monopoly and program diversity 
that he found depends on a host of assumptions: the particular skewness 
found in the distribution of demand, the willingness of audiences to view 
second-choice programming, the magnitude and variability of program 
cost, and the availability of excess channel capacity.109 These limitations 
have been analyzed elsewhere110 and those arguments will not be repeated 
here. 
Other fundamental limitations to Steiner’s analysis have largely gone 
unnoticed. For example, his approach necessarily presupposes that 
programming can be segregated into one of several discrete formats.111 
Experience has shown that radio and television programming defies easy 
categorization. Consider the popular “oldies” radio format that, in a fairly 
short period, multiplied from one format to several, as different stations 
targeted listeners of different ages. The FCC has recognized that radio and 
television formats are far too dynamic and varied to be classified in such a 
simple, categorical manner, and the Supreme Court has given its blessing to 
this conclusion.112 
Equally problematic is Steiner’s assumption that entry by an 
additional station into an occupied format simply duplicates existing 
programming.113 In effect, he assumes that, within any particular format, 
programming is completely fungible. The most casual perusal of the radio 
market falsifies this assumption––the popularity of radio stations offering 
 
 108. See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 96, at 144–48. The extent to which increased revenue 
will result in increased expenditures on programming depends on the elasticity of demand. Bruce Owen 
and Steven Wildman note the theoretical possibility that competitive entry might stimulate the 
production of higher-quality programming. See id. at 85. In either scenario, governmental restrictions 
on horizontal concentration would have a direct impact on program quality. 
 109. See Beebe, supra note 98, at 23–31; Rothenberg, supra note 98, at 49–50. 
 110. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1938–42. 
 111. For similar efforts, see Edward Greenberg & Harold J. Barnett, TV Program Diversity—New 
Evidence and Old Theories, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 89, 90 (1971); Levin, supra note 29, at 84–87. 
 112. See Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 861–63 ¶¶ 11–15 (1976) [hereinafter Format 
Policy Statement], aff’d sub nom. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
 113. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 199. See also id. at 206 (relaxing this assumption). 
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the same format category varies widely.114 Stations that appear to be 
offering the same type of programming typically provide very different 
levels of utility to listeners. This suggests that program types might be 
better understood not as falling into discrete categories, but rather as 
occupying a position along a spectrum of program characteristics. Revising 
the model of program selection in this manner would call into question the 
assumption that duplication of an existing program type by a new entrant 
necessarily yields no welfare benefit, since it remains possible that a new 
entrant might attract new listeners or provide greater satisfaction to 
members of the audience who were already listening.115 
Finally, Steiner’s approach measured welfare through a voting model 
that simply counted the number of viewers in any audience.116 The inability 
of such voting-oriented models to take intensity of preferences into account 
limits their ability to assess economic welfare properly.117 In addition, 
omitting any aspect of price competition eliminates the possibility that 
welfare gains created by increased program diversity might be offset by 
welfare losses incurred through the exercise of oligopoly power in a 
concentrated market. Although Steiner’s voting model might have made 
sense at a time when radio broadcasters could not typically charge for their 
programs,118 it makes less sense in a world in which fee-based radio and 
television services are a reality. 
These weaknesses of the Steiner model indicate that local media 
markets might be better analyzed under the more general model of spatial 
competition pioneered by Harold Hotelling. This model assumes that 
producers compete by occupying a position along a continuous product 
spectrum, rather than by placing themselves into one of a discrete number 
of product categories.119 The legal literature120 and the FCC have largely 
overlooked these models.121 
 
 114. See Format Policy Statement, supra note 112, at 863–64 ¶ 18. 
 115. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 204. 
 116. See id. at 196–97. 
 117. See id. at 197. 
 118. See id. at 198. 
 119. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). For a general 
introduction to spatial competition models, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 241–46 (2004). For applications to television programming, see 
Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of Broadcasting, 55 PUB. CHOICE 163 (1987); 
Alessandro Vaglio, A Model of the Audience for TV Broadcasting: Implications for Advertising 
Competition and Regulation, 42 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI 
33 (1995); David Waterman, Diversity and Quality of Information Products in a Monopolistically 
Competitive Industry, 4 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 291 (1991). 
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I hope to offer a more complete application of spatial competition 
models to the FCC’s media ownership regulations in my future work. For 
now, it suffices to note that spatial models suggest that the relationship 
between horizontal concentration and welfare may be more complex than 
Steiner’s model suggests. First, Hotelling-style spatial competition 
acknowledges that entry by a similar product can yield welfare benefits, 
both by capturing incremental demand and by allowing some audience 
members who were already viewing to consume programming that offers a 
better fit with their ideal preferences. These models also reflect how joint 
ownership can cause welfare to increase by inducing firms to pay attention 
to whether their revenue is the product of demand creation or demand 
diversion.122 Finally, the more sophisticated spatial models take into 
account the fact that any economic benefits resulting from a monopolist’s 
refusal to duplicate existing programming must be offset by the welfare 
losses associated with the reduction in price competition.123 
Spatial models thus provide reason to be somewhat skeptical of 
Steiner’s simplistic conclusion that market concentration necessarily 
promotes greater program variety as well as the supposition advanced by 
many commentators that media concentration invariably reduces the 
diversity of media content.124 Although monopolists’ unwillingness to 
cannibalize audiences from their own stations may tend to promote product 
diversity, their willingness to withdraw stations from the market and their 
tendency to charge supercompetitive prices works in the opposite direction. 
Which of these two countervailing effects dominates is an empirical 
question that cannot be determined a priori. Formal models have shown 
that either too much or too little program diversity may exist in equilibrium 
 
 120. The only discussion of any significance appearing in the law review literature is Spitzer, 
supra note 96, at 314–16. 
 121. The only FCC reference to this literature of which I am aware is the bare citation of a paper 
by Richard Schmalensee that employed a spatial competition model. See Review of the Commission’s 
Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 
3524, 3551 n.81 (1995). 
 122. See JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION 57 (1991); Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 
RAND J. ECON. 380, 388–89 (1985); Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, Product Differentiation, 
Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 12 BELL J. ECON. 217, 226–27 (1981); N. Gregory 
Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 49, 52, 
54–55 (1986). 
 123. See JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395–404 (2000); B. 
Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16 
RAND J. ECON. 282 (1985); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL 
J. ECON. 141, 143–45 (1979). 
 124. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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and that monopoly may or may not produce greater program diversity or 
generate greater economic benefits.125 Attempts to resolve this question 
empirically have yielded mixed results. While one leading study concluded 
that increases in horizontal concentration in local radio markets tended to 
increase program diversity,126 other studies have confirmed the tendency 
toward duplication and underscored the critical role played by channel 
capacity.127 Yet another study of the television industry focusing on 
product differentiation concluded that program variety approached optimal 
levels,128 while another study of the radio industry found excess entry.129 
Still other studies have drawn somewhat different conclusions.130 
Fortunately, for the purposes of this Article, the precise relationship 
between market concentration and program diversity need not be resolved. 
It is sufficient to show that a relationship does exist, even if the direction 
and magnitude of the effect remain somewhat uncertain.131 This 
relationship reveals that the degree of horizontal concentration permitted 
under current media ownership regulations will have a direct impact on 
media content. 
 
 125. See ANDERSON & COATE, supra note 42, at 19–23. 
 126. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence 
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1009 (2001). 
 127. See August E. Grant, The Promise Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on 
Television, 7 J. MEDIA ECON. 51, 62 (1994); Robert P. Rogers & John R. Woodbury, Market Structure, 
Program Diversity, and Radio Audience Size, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 81 (1996). 
 128. See Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Television 
Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624 (2001). 
 129. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio 
Broadcasting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397 (1999). This study acknowledged, however, that the radio 
industry is somewhat unusual in that it serves two different groups of customers—advertisers and 
listeners—only one of which (advertisers) is able to make direct payments for programming. What 
appears to be excess entry when measured solely in terms of benefits to advertisers may in fact be 
efficient when measured in terms of both advertisers and listeners. Id. at 412–14. 
 130. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,740–42 ¶¶ 310–315 (reviewing the 
literature). 
 131. As Professor Baker points out, my conclusion that horizontal concentration has an 
ambiguous impact on media content is not completely consistent with my overarching claim that the 
forms of architectural censorship I have identified reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of media 
programming. See Baker, supra note 13, at 739–740. I concede that my attempt to reduce the central 
thesis of this Article into a pithy catchphrase represents something of an overstatement in this limited 
respect. That said, I do believe that my summation does accurately reflect the negative impact that the 
other forms of architectural censorship I have identified have on media content. Furthermore, the fact 
remains that horizontal restrictions are having a direct effect on the content of media speech regardless 
of the direction of the effect. The fact that governmental actions are altering program content should 
raise First Amendment concerns regardless of the precise nature of the effect. 
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2. The Role of Efficiencies from Horizontal Integration 
Horizontal integration also affects program diversity by allowing 
media groups to realize cost efficiencies. Horizontal integration enables 
entities that own multiple stations to economize on costs, which in turn can 
support increases in the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming 
offered by allowing the media industry to invest a larger proportion of its 
revenue in program production. The FCC has repeatedly recognized that 
local crossownership provides precisely these benefits by allowing the 
station owner to combine administrative, programming, sales, marketing, 
promotion, and production costs.132 Indeed, some data suggest that 
crossownership can reduce the cost of these functions by 30% to 35%.133 
In addition, crossownership can help newspapers realize more 
efficient use of their efforts to collect local news. Like all forms of 
television and radio programming, local news bears many of the classic 
indicia of a pure public good. In particular, consumption of local news is 
nonrivalrous, in that consumption of it by one person does not reduce the 
supply available for others. In economic terms, this is usually modeled by 
assuming that once a media entity has incurred the fixed costs associated 
with gathering the news, the marginal cost of sharing with others is zero. 
Thus, once the costs of collecting the local news have been incurred, 
economic success depends on disseminating that information to as many 
paying customers as possible.134 Thus, as a theoretical matter, the greater 
return on investment made possible by crossownership may enable media 
outlets to provide more diverse programming.135 Empirical studies have 
largely borne this out.136 
 
 132. See Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Report 
and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,920–22 ¶¶ 34–36 (1999); Radio Rules and Policies, supra note 78, at 
2760–61 ¶ 11, 2774 ¶ 37; 1989 Second Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 78, at 1746–47 ¶¶ 39–51; 
1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at 1727 ¶ 36. 
 133. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast Multiple 
Ownership Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 1138, 1140–41 ¶ 20 (1987). 
 134. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1657–59. 
 135. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,678 ¶¶ 155–156, 13,753–61 ¶¶ 342–
358, 13,772–73 ¶¶ 382–385; 1989 Second Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 78, at 1747 ¶ 44. 
 136. See John C. Busterna, Television Station Ownership Effects on Programming and Idea 
Diversity: Baseline Data, 1 J. MEDIA ECON. 63 (1988); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., George S. Ford & 
Thomas Koutsky, Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and National 
Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 180 (2000); David Pritchard, A Tale of Three Cities: “Diverse 
and Antagonistic” Information in Situations of Local Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 31 (2001). These studies largely corroborated earlier research finding that media ownership 
had little to no impact on the diversity of program content. See 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra 
note 71, at 1073 ¶ 97 (noting that empirical studies of the impact of ownership on content were 
“inconclusive”); WALTER S. BAER, HENRY GELLER, JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & KAREN B. POSSNER, 
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It is thus clear that the degree of horizontal integration permitted can 
have a fairly dramatic impact on the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
speech. Horizontal ownership restrictions represent a little-recognized, but 
important, form of architectural censorship. 
D. RESTRICTIONS ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
The FCC has long been concerned that vertical integration in the radio 
and television industry would harm competition.137 The focus has been on 
whether vertical integration or vertical contractual agreements can allow a 
firm to use a dominant position in one market (called the primary market) 
to harm competition in another market (called the secondary market). 
These concerns animated the FCC’s first major regulatory initiative, 
commonly known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules. The Rules were driven 
by the belief that the then-existing triopoly of radio networks was hindering 
the emergence of competition from new networks138 and was inhibiting 
local control of the programming carried by any particular station.139 As a 
result, the Chain Broadcasting Rules strictly limited radio networks’ ability 
to own broadcast stations140 and restricted the networks’ ability to use 
affiliation agreements to limit the autonomy of local stations.141 The 
Supreme Court sustained the Rules in the seminal decision on broadcast 
 
CONCENTRATION OF MASS MEDIA OWNERSHIP: ASSESSING THE STATE OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 121–
40 (1974) (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that crossownership plays a “minor role, if 
any” in influencing media content); STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON, REGULATION OF 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: AN ASSESSMENT 28–31, 52, 
57–59 (1984) (reviewing the empirical literature and concluding that crossownership has no clear 
impact on program diversity); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does It 
Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755, 770 (1995) (“Multiple studies have concurred that 
programming differences related to group ownership are mixed and, even at that, are quite small.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 137. For a more detailed review of the history and theory of the FCC’s regulation of vertical 
integration in the television industry, see Yoo, supra note 45, at 181–248. The primary focus of this 
discussion is downstream vertical integration by television and radio networks. It bears mentioning that 
at times the FCC has also regulated upstream vertical integration by networks into program supply. For 
critiques of the now-notorious and defunct “prime time access rule” (“PTAR”) and the financial interest 
and syndication rules (“finsyn”), see THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 72–74, 99–100 (1994); Chen, supra note 100, at 1454–58. 
 138. See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 13, at 51, 59, 66. 
 139. Id. at 64–65. 
 140. Specifically, the FCC prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any market 
and from owning any stations in markets in which competition was substantially restrained. See id. at 
92, repealed in part by Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 
Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 4540 ¶ 10 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order]. 
This rule was overshadowed by the national television station ownership limits discussed below. 
 141. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 13, at 51–66. 
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regulation, NBC v. United States.142 The FCC subsequently extended the 
Chain Broadcasting Rules to television in 1946.143 In time, the FCC would 
repeal them with respect to radio144 and roll back some of the restrictions 
with respect to television as well.145 Certain television-related provisions 
still remain in effect.146 
Congress has also taken steps to limit vertical integration in the cable 
industry.147 The “channel occupancy” provision authorized the FCC to 
limit the channel capacity that cable operators could devote to their 
vertically affiliated networks.148 Congress also enacted a series of access 
requirements designed to protect against the dangers of vertical integration. 
For example, the leased access provision requires all cable systems with 
more than thirty-five channels to set aside part of their channel capacity for 
use by unaffiliated programmers.149 The program access provisions prevent 
vertically integrated programmers from discriminating against unaffiliated 
operators150 or from entering into exclusive dealing contracts.151 Most 
 
 142. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 143. Amendment to Part 3 of the Commission’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (F.C.C. Jan. 1, 1946). 
 144. Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning Network Broadcasting by 
Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, Report, Statement of Policy, and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 674 
(1977). 
 145. See 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order, supra note 140; Review of Rules and Policies 
Concerning Network Broadcasting by Television Stations: Elimination or Modification of Section 
73.658(c) of the Commission’s Rules, Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755 (1989). 
 146. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2004). A proposal to repeal these remaining restrictions has been 
pending without action since 1995. See Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing 
Programming Practices of Broadcast Television Networks and Affiliates, Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 11,951 (1995). 
 147. Even before Congress acted, the FCC placed some limits on vertical integration in the cable 
industry when it promulgated regulations prohibiting national television networks from holding 
ownership stakes in cable operators.  See Community Antenna Order, supra note 72, at 821 ¶ 15.  The 
FCC relaxed this restriction in 1992.  See Order to Eliminate the Prohibition on Common Ownership, 
supra note 78.  Congress abolished it altogether in 1996.  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104, § 202(f)(1), 106 Stat. 56, 111. 
 148. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2000). The FCC set this limit at 40% of the operators’ channel 
capacity. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Report and Order, 8 
F.C.C.R. 8565, 8592–96 ¶¶ 64–70 (1993). The channel occupancy limit applied only to the first 
seventy-five channels of any cable operator’s capacity. Channel capacity in excess of seventy-five 
channels was not subject to the limit. Id. at 8601–02 ¶ 84. The D.C. Circuit overturned the 40% limit. 
See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137–39 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 149. The amount of channel capacity that must be set aside varies from 10% to 15%, depending 
on the size of the cable operator. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1). Enactment of this statute overturned a previous 
Supreme Court decision holding that the FCC lacked the authority to mandate leased access. See FCC 
v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
 150. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(B). 
 151. Id. § 548 (c)(2). 
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importantly, Congress enacted the must-carry provisions, requiring cable 
operators to provide free carriage to all full-power television stations 
broadcasting in their service area.152 Although enacted in part to preserve 
horizontal competition in local advertising markets,153 must-carry was also 
intended to guard against vertical integration.154 
In addition, the FCC has historically limited the number of television 
and radio stations that any one entity can own nationwide.155 It justified 
these restrictions with the need to foster competition,156 the need to 
promote a diversity of sources,157 and the desire to encourage local 
initiative.158 Congress eventually eliminated the national station ownership 
limits for radio and amended the national television station ownership limit 
to permit ownership of any number of television stations reaching less than 
 
 152. Id. §§ 534, 535. 
 153. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 200–01 (1997). 
 154. See id. at 198–99 (justifying must-carry in part on testimony indicating that vertical 
integration gives “cable operators . . . an incentive to drop local broadcasters and to favor affiliated 
programmers”). See also Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460–61 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534–535) (finding that 
vertical integration in the cable industry has given “cable operators . . . the incentive and ability to favor 
their affiliated programmers” and “could make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to 
secure carriage on cable systems”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1133, 1158 (noting that “vertical integration gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor their 
affiliated programming services” and might lead a cable operator to refuse to carry unaffiliated 
programmers). 
 155. The FCC initially set the national cap for television at three stations. See Rules and 
Regulations Governing Experimental Television Broadcast Stations, § 4.226, 6 Fed. Reg. 2283, 2284–
85 (F.C.C. May 6, 1941). The national cap for radio was set at five stations. See Multiple Ownership, 9 
Fed. Reg. 5442 (F.C.C. May 23, 1944). By 1954, a series of subsequent amendments eventually turned 
both the national radio and television station ownership limits into what became known as a “Rule of 
Seven.” See 1953 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 13, at 291 (limiting any one owner to five 
television stations and seven radio stations nationwide); Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 
Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954) (increasing the national limit for television from five to seven 
stations so long as two stations were UHF). The Rule of Seven was sustained against a judicial 
challenge by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). The limit 
was later liberalized into a “Rule of Twelve.” See Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 
73.35, 73.240 & 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM & 
Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Multiple 
Ownership Order] (authorizing group ownership of up to twelve stations), on reconsideration, 100 
F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (adding the additional requirement that the twelve-station group reach no more than 
25% of the national audience). 
 156. See Storer Broad., 351 U.S. at 203 (concluding that the FCC’s public interest mandate 
requires it to “assure fair opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities”); 1984 
Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 155, at 38–46 ¶¶ 64–86, 50–51 ¶¶ 97–99 
 157. See Storer Broad., 351 U.S. at 203; 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1941); 1984 Multiple Ownership 
Order, supra note 155, at 24–38 ¶¶ 24–63. 
 158. See 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1941). 
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35% of the national audience.159 Congress also passed legislation 
authorizing the FCC to establish a limit on the number of cable subscribers 
that any one company can reach nationwide.160 The FCC eventually set that 
limit at 30%.161 
The first round of judicial challenges to these provisions proved 
unsuccessful.162 More recent decisions have exhibited the courts’ greater 
willingness to invalidate vertical ownership restrictions. In Time Warner 
Entertainment Co. v. FCC,163 the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 30% cable 
subscriber limit set by the FCC based on a failure to implement the 
provision in the manner prescribed by Congress.164 The court also struck 
down the FCC’s channel occupancy limit on First Amendment grounds.165 
Furthermore, in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,166 the D.C. Circuit 
overturned the FCC’s decision not to eliminate the national television 
station ownership cap during its first biennial review.167 The court held that 
 
 159. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 110 Stat. 56, 110 (codified 
as amended at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2004)). 
 160. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (2000). 
 161. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Report and Order, 8 
F.C.C.R. 8565, 8576–79 ¶¶ 24–29 (1993) (setting this limit at 30% of all nationwide subscribers). Cable 
systems were allowed to reach up to 35% of nationwide cable homes provided that such additional 
cable systems were minority-controlled. Id. at 8578–79 ¶ 28. After seeking additional comment, the 
FCC subsequently reaffirmed these limits. See Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Horizontal Ownership Limits, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 
14,462, 14,467–83 ¶¶ 9–51 (1998); Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Horizontal Ownership Limits, Third Report and Order, 14 
F.C.C.R. 19,098, 19,113–27 ¶¶ 36–70 (1999). 
 162. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (sustaining must-carry against a facial challenge); Time 
Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (sustaining the subscriber limit and 
the channel occupancy provision against a facial challenge); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 
957, 967–71, 977–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sustaining the leased access and vertically integrated 
programmer provisions against a facial challenge). Interestingly, the district court did initially sustain a 
facial challenge to the subscriber limit provision, only to see its decision overturned on appeal. See 
Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 211 F.3d at 1316–20. 
 163. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 164. Id. at 1133–36. 
 165. Id. at 1137–39. Interestingly, the distinction seems to turn on the fact that Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group and Fox Television Stations involved broadcasting and thus were only held to 
rational basis scrutiny, whereas Time Warner involved regulation of the cable industry and thus was 
held to intermediate scrutiny. On the problematic nature of this distinction, see infra Part II.C. 
 166. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 
537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 167. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Biennial Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,072–75 ¶¶ 25–30 (2000). 
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refusal to repeal the rule violated both the Administrative Procedure Act 
and the FCC’s obligation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to 
“repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public 
interest.”168 The FCC responded by revising the national television station 
ownership rule to permit companies to own any number of stations so long 
as the station group could reach no more than 45% of the nation’s 
television households.169 Again, the FCC analyzed the issues in terms of 
the policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism, placing primary 
reliance on localism considerations.170 The ensuing controversy over the 
decision led Congress to enact legislation setting the national television 
station ownership cap at 39% and exempting the restriction from 
mandatory periodic review by the FCC.171 
The national television station ownership and cable subscriber limits 
are often misconstrued as being horizontal in focus.172 Properly evaluated, 
horizontal restrictions bar mergers among direct competitors who would 
otherwise be serving the same customers. In the case of U.S. media 
regulation, excess horizontal concentration is prevented by the rules 
prohibiting crossownership of media outlets in the same city described in 
the preceding subsection. The national television station ownership and 
cable subscriber limits are more properly regarded as prohibiting joint 
ownership of television stations or cable systems in different cities. Even 
though these jointly owned properties occupy the same product market, 
their geographic markets are distinct, and thus they do not compete with 
one another. In other words, allowing a television station operating in New 
York City to merge with one operating in Los Angeles does not involve a 
merger between direct competitors and does not have any impact on 
options available to any viewer. 
 
 168. Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1040–49. 
 169. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,842–45 ¶¶ 578–84. 
 170. Id. at 13,818–42 ¶¶ 508–578. 
 171. Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100. 
Setting the national television ownership cap at 39% had the practical advantage of making it 
unnecessary for Fox and Viacom to divest the television stations they had acquired in excess of the 
previous 35% cap pursuant to temporary waivers granted by the FCC. Making it possible for Fox and 
Viacom to retain these stations removed much of the political impetus for further liberalization of the 
national ownership cap. 
 172. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 32–33 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1165–66 
(referring to the growth of multiple system operators as “horizontal integration” and “horizontal 
concentration”); Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997) (referring to the growth of multiple system 
operators as “[h]orizontal concentration”); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (referring to the subscriber limit provision as a “horizontal” restriction). 
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Although group ownership of broadcast stations does not enhance 
horizontal market power with respect to viewers, it may enhance vertical 
market power by increasing the group’s bargaining leverage with respect to 
networks and other program suppliers. As a result, the national television 
and radio ownership restrictions are more properly regarded as protecting 
against vertical market power rather than horizontal market power.173 
Concerns about vertical integration are also evident in the furor that 
has surrounded many recent mega-mergers in the television industry, 
including Disney’s acquisition of ABC, Viacom’s merger with CBS, Time 
Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting, and America Online’s 
subsequent acquisition of Time Warner. Each merger was accompanied by 
a spate of commentary warning of dire consequences should the mergers be 
permitted.174 
1. Structural Preconditions Implicit in Vertical Integration Theory 
The nature of the economic threat posed by vertical integration has 
long been one of the most hotly contested issues in competition policy.175 
Although proponents of the leading schools of antitrust law and economics 
have often disagreed sharply over the extent to which vertical integration 
can harm competition, they do share common ground on some basic 
points.176 Both sides in the debate agree that certain structural 
preconditions must be satisfied before vertical integration can pose a threat 
to competition. All of the vertical integration models explicitly or implicitly 
acknowledge that the primary market must be concentrated before vertical 
integration can harm competition. If this precondition is not met, the 
allegedly anticompetitive firm has no dominant position to use as leverage. 
Furthermore, the secondary market must be protected by barriers to entry if 
attempts to reduce competition in the secondary market are to have any 
hope of success. In addition, even if these structural preconditions are met, 
 
 173. Yoo, supra note 45, at 219, 222. 
 174. See, e.g., John H. Barton, The International Video Industry: Principles for Vertical 
Agreements and Integration, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 67 (2004); Symposium, Viacom-CBS 
Merger, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 499 (2000); Patrick M. Cox, Note, What Goes Up Must Come Down: 
Grounding the Dizzying Height of Vertical Mergers in the Entertainment Industry, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
261 (1996). 
 175. See, e.g., Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 575 (1999) (“Few subjects in American antitrust law have undergone as many 
changes and generated as much debate among economists and lawyers as the regulation of vertical 
arrangements.”). 
 176. The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis appearing in Yoo, supra 
note 45, at 187–205. 
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both approaches acknowledge the possibility that efficiencies may exist 
that nonetheless make vertical integration economically desirable. 
In fact, these structural preconditions have become so much a part of 
the conventional wisdom that they are incorporated into guidelines 
employed by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to 
evaluate the impact of vertical mergers on competition.177 These guidelines 
explicitly acknowledge that vertical mergers are unlikely to harm 
competition unless the primary market is concentrated.178 The measure of 
market concentration employed by the guidelines is the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (“HHI”), which is calculated by squaring the market 
share of each competitor and then summing the resulting numbers. For 
example, a market of four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20%, and 
20% would have an HHI of 2600.179 The result is a continuum that situates 
the concentration of a market on a scale from 0 (in the case of complete 
market deconcentration) to 10,000 (in the case of monopoly). When the 
post-merger HHI of the primary market is below 1800, vertical integration 
is considered unproblematic.180 This standard is somewhat more lenient 
than that applied to horizontal mergers, which are more likely to create 
competitive problems.181 The D.C. Circuit recognized the importance of 
these structural preconditions in striking down the FCC’s attempt to 
implement the channel occupancy provision enacted by Congress.182 
 
 177. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 4.212, 4.213, 4.221, 
4.24 (promulgated in 1984 and reaffirmed in 1992 and 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf. 
 178. Id. § 4.213. 
 179. 302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600. 
 180. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 177, § 4.213. See also id. § 4.131 (using the 1800 HHI 
threshold for determining when vertical integration can harm potential competition); id. § 4.221 (using 
the 1800 HHI threshold for determining when vertical integration can facilitate collusion). 
 181. Id. § 4.0. Unlike vertical mergers, which are thought to raise competitive problems only if the 
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, horizontal mergers are open to challenge even when post-merger HHI 
is as low as 1000. Specifically, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines classify markets in which the post-
merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 as “moderately concentrated.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51(b), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/horiz_book/ 15.html (Apr. 8, 1997). Horizontal mergers in markets that fall within 
this range “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and may be subject to challenge if they 
increase HHI by more than 100 points. Id. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines treat markets in which the 
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800 as “highly concentrated.” Id. § 1.51(c). In these markets, mergers that 
raise post-merger HHI by more than 50 points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and 
may be challenged. Mergers that raise post-merger HHI 100 points are “presumed . . . to create or 
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise” and are likely to be challenged. Id. 
 182. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1138–39 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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2. Applying the Structural Preconditions to the Television Industry 
Determining whether a particular market is concentrated depends on 
proper market definition, which in turn requires the identification of the 
relevant product and geographic markets. The relevant market is best 
understood if the television industry is viewed as the multilevel chain of 
distribution depicted in Figure 2.183 The uppermost level is occupied by the 
networks and movie studios that create television programs. The 
intermediate level is occupied by local television stations and local cable 
operators, who acquire programming from program suppliers and deliver 
them locally. The bottommost level is occupied by end users, who obtain 
television service from local television stations and cable operators. 
Many mistakenly assume that the relevant market is the one in which 
households obtain television programming from broadcast stations and 
cable operators (denoted in the figure by the letter B). B is a local market 
because, until recently, households could only obtain television from an 
outlet located within their local community. In addition, because the 
number of entities from which households could obtain television 
programming has historically been rather limited, if this were the relevant 
market, it would appear to be sufficiently concentrated to make vertical 
integration a real anticompetitive threat.184 
 
 183. This is a somewhat simplified version of the description of the industry advanced in Yoo, 
supra note 45, at 182–83, 220–21. The more complex analysis presented in that paper disaggregated the 
first stage depicted in Figure 2 into two different stages rather than lumping program producers and 
television networks into the same category. Because that distinction is not as central to the argument 
presented here, the basic framework can be simplified in this manner without any loss of analytic 
power. 
 184. It is unclear whether this is still true. The arrival of DBS as a significant multichannel video 
programming distributor (“MVPD”) has made the market for local delivery of television signals much 
more competitive. The FCC’s most recent data indicate that as of June 2004, DBS had captured over 
25% of the MVPD market. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, FCC 05-13, slip op. at 38–39 ¶ 54, 115 
tbl.B-1 (F.C.C. Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-13A1.pdf. This exceeds the 15% threshold 
established by Congress for determining when a cable operator faces effective competition from other 
MVPDs. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). 
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FIGURE 2. Vertical chain of production in the television industry 
 
A 
B 
Television Networks and 
Program Providers 
Local Television Stations 
and Cable Operators 
Households 
 The problem with this analysis is that limits on the number of viewers 
that one station or cable operator group can reach nationwide have no 
impact whatsoever on the degree of market concentration in any local 
market. This fundamental insight can be seen most clearly by conducting 
the following thought experiment. Suppose the FCC banned vertical 
integration in the television industry altogether and required every 
television station owner and cable operator to divest any ownership 
interests in any network or program supplier. Would doing so decrease the 
ability of television stations and cable operators to exercise market power 
in market B? Clearly, the answer is no. Market power in B exists by virtue 
of the relatively small number of options any particular household has for 
obtaining television service. Preventing television stations and cable 
operators from holding ownership interests in networks would not increase 
or decrease the number of those options one iota. Forcing owners of 
television stations and cable operators to sell their proprietary interests in 
television programming would have no impact on market power in market 
B. 
Vertical disintegration could potentially have an impact on market A, 
the upstream market in which local television stations and cable operators 
meet networks and program suppliers. The economics of producing 
television programming (particularly the fact that it requires the incurrence 
of substantial up-front costs) leaves program producers vulnerable to 
strategic behavior by local television stations and cable operators. 
Restrictions on the number of television stations and cable operators one 
entity can own nationwide has the inevitable effect of reducing program 
producers’ ability to use vertical integration or vertical contractual 
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arrangements to internalize these risks.185 In addition, the national 
television station ownership and cable subscriber limits also affect the 
relative bargaining power of the players in market A by ensuring that the 
networks and other program suppliers negotiate with station and cable 
operator groups that represent smaller proportions of the national audience. 
The proper focus, then, is on market A, in which television stations 
and cable operators bargain with networks and program suppliers. On 
reflection, it becomes clear that the geographic scope of this market is 
national, not local. Even in the extreme case, where the local cable operator 
possesses monopoly power over viewers in a particular city, that operator is 
unlikely to be able to exert any significant market power against a 
television network that can reach a sufficient number of other viewers 
located elsewhere in the nation. A program producer cares less about 
whether it is able to reach viewers in any particular city and more about 
how much of the national market it is able to access. In other words, it is 
the network’s national reach, not its local reach, that matters. The network 
would, of course, prefer to reach all viewers nationwide. That it may be 
unable to reach certain customers is of no greater concern than it would be 
to manufacturers of particular brands of cars, shoes, or other conventional 
goods who are unable to gain access to the entire country. Their inability to 
reach customers in any particular geographic area does not threaten 
competition so long as they are able to obtain access to a sufficient number 
of customers located elsewhere. The proper question is not whether local 
television stations and cable operators wield market power in the local 
market for television viewers in any particular city, but rather whether 
groups of television stations and local cable systems possess sufficient 
market power to harm competition in the nationwide market for obtaining 
television content. 
When viewed in this manner, it becomes relatively clear that the 
relevant primary market (as in the national market for household delivery 
of television programming) is unconcentrated. Consider, for example, the 
current national television station ownership rule, which prohibits 
television station groups that can reach more than 39% of the U.S. 
television audience.186 It would be a mistake to assume that this limit 
would permit a television station group to control 39% of the market. This 
is because no broadcast network is able to capture more than 15% of the 
 
 185. See Yoo, supra note 45, at 192–200, 213–17, 232–37. 
 186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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potential audience that it reaches.187 Thus, even if a group were able to 
reach 39% of the U.S. market, it would only be able to capture less than 
one sixth of those viewers. Setting the national audience cap at 39% 
effectively guarantees that no group of television stations will control more 
than 6% of the national audience. In that case, there are at least sixteen 
independent players bidding in the national market for television 
programming, more than enough to ensure that the market remains 
competitive.188 Indeed, these numbers suggest that there would have been 
little danger setting the national audience cap at the 45% level that was 
overturned by Congress. 
Similar reasoning applies to the national cable subscriber limits. As of 
June 2002, no multichannel video program distributor (“MVPD”) 
controlled more than 15% of the national market, and the HHI of the total 
market was 884.189 By June 2004, Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable 
properties caused HHI to rise to 1097.190 Even this higher number falls well 
below the enforcement threshold under the vertical merger guidelines.191 
The level of concentration in the market for MVPDs is thus too diffuse to 
give any MVPD market power sufficient to give rise to anticompetitive 
concerns.192 
 
 187. For example, the highest ranked network during the November 2004 sweeps period (CBS), 
was only able to capture 12% of adult viewers. See Jim Finkle, How Fall Played Out; CBS Triumphs, 
ABC Improves, NBC Falters, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 2004, at 14. 
 188. Even if the entire industry were composed of station groups of the largest size, the HHI 
would be less than 700, well below the levels thought to raise competitive concerns. 
 189. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,913 tbl.B-3 (2002). 
 190. See Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 184, at 77 ¶ 144, 118 tbl.B-3, 
119 tbl.B-4 
 191. In fact, the level of concentration in the market for MVPDs approaches the level of 
nonenforcement under the more stringent guidelines governing horizontal mergers. Indeed, as the FCC 
has noted, economic theory and empirical studies suggest that a market need not have more than five 
participants of roughly equal size. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,731 ¶ 289 & 
n.609 (citing economic commentary). This suggests that HHIs as high as 2000 might well be 
unproblematic. That said, the Third Circuit rejected the FCC’s finding that five equal-sized competitors 
would be sufficient to protect competition as arbitrary and capricious. See Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 432–34 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 192. Professor Baker invokes Edward Chamberlin’s classic analysis of monopolistic competition 
as support for his belief that media entities typically earn high operating profits. See Baker, supra note 
13, at 737 & n.15. See also id. at 750–751. I offer a more complete analysis of the implications of 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition for media policy in Yoo, supra note 18, at 1602–28, 1633–36. 
For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that Chamberlin himself did not believe that firms 
engaged in monopolistic competition would earn sustainable economic profit. Although firms might 
earn some profit in the short-run, entry by other firms selling similar products would eventually 
dissipate any supercompetitive returns. See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 83–85 (8th ed. 1969). 
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Furthermore, an empirical analysis of the relevant secondary market—
comprised of television networks and program providers—reveals that it is 
sufficiently unprotected by barriers to entry to obviate any anticompetitive 
concerns. The FCC reports that the total number of television networks has 
steadily increased, swelling from seventy networks in 1990193 to a total of 
388 networks in 2004, with another seventy-eight networks in the planning 
stages.194 In addition, the percentage of vertically integrated networks has 
declined more or less steadily over the past decade.195 
It is also likely that vertical integration in the radio and television 
industry will yield sufficient efficiencies to justify condoning it. The FCC 
has acknowledged that permitting broader network station ownership could 
yield substantial managerial, technical, and operational efficiencies.196 
Furthermore, because the creation of television programming typically 
requires the incurrence of substantial sunk costs, program producers are 
often vulnerable to hold-up, free riding, and other forms of strategic 
behavior.197 The classic solution to such problems is through vertical 
integration or through some form of vertical contractual restraint.198 
Empirical studies confirm that, on balance, vertical integration in the cable 
industry tends to be welfare enhancing.199 
 
Chamberlin’s zero-profit result is in turn subject to several caveats. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1607–09. 
Subsequent research has shown that the general validity of Chamberlin’s zero-profit result depends on 
the magnitude of the fixed costs relative to the overall market. See Yoo, supra note 119, at 240. Baker’s 
observation would have had greater applicability during earlier eras, when television and radio markets 
were protected by entry barriers. The emergence of alternative transmission technologies and new 
networks has largely dissipated the danger of supercompetitive returns. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 
1633–36. This suggests that media policy would be better served by focusing on lowering barriers to 
entry, which in turn would require an abandonment of the commitment to fostering free radio and 
television as well as lowering the barriers to vertical integration. 
 193. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 1691 tbl.8 (2004) [hereinafter Tenth Annual 
Report on Video Competition]. 
 194. Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 184, at 78 ¶ 145, 81 ¶ 152. 
 195. Tenth Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 193, at 1690–91 ¶ 142 & tbl.8 
(noting that the percentage of vertically integrated networks declined steadily from 50% in 1994 to 30% 
in 2002 before rising slightly to 33% in 2003); Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra 
note 184, at 78 ¶ 145 (noting that in 2004, the percentage of vertically integrated networks once again 
declined to 23%). 
 196. See 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order, supra note 140, at 4540 ¶ 11. 
 197. See Yoo, supra note 45, at 213–17, 232–37. 
 198. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Lester G. 
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
 199. See Tasneem Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the 
Cable Television Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 430, 448–50 (2001). 
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It thus appears that the structure of the television industry makes it 
unlikely that vertical integration will harm competition, as demonstrated 
eloquently by the failure of the Disney-ABC, Viacom-CBS, Time Warner-
Turner Broadcasting, and AOL-Time Warner mergers to generate 
significant anticompetitive harms. Instead, the existing regulations limiting 
vertical integration only serve to prevent industry participants from 
realizing the available efficiencies, which in turn reduces total quantity, 
quality, and diversity of speech. As a result, the regulatory restraints on 
vertical integration appear to represent still another form of architectural 
censorship. 
II. ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP’S IMMUNITY FROM 
MEANINGFUL FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY 
Many of the extant structural regulations thus constitute forms of 
architectural censorship that can have a dramatic impact on the quantity, 
quality, and diversity of radio and television programming. As a result, one 
would expect that the incidental impact structural regulation can have on 
speech would be subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. This Part 
analyzes the level of scrutiny to which structural regulation should be 
subject under current First Amendment doctrine. Unfortunately, my 
analysis suggests that the identified types of architectural censorship will 
be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review. 
A. THE NATURE OF ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP 
The impact that structural regulation can have on media content 
should raise First Amendment concerns. Consider first the reductions in the 
total quantity of television and radio programming. Regulations that 
impede all forms of speech without regard to content still impair the free 
flow of expression. That a regulation may have affected all viewpoints 
equally does not change the fact that the reduction in opportunities for 
expression effects a First Amendment harm, whether viewed from the 
perspective of individual liberty or the proper functioning of the democratic 
process.200 Scholars have also cautioned that media-specific regulations 
allow special interest groups to redirect the regulatory process toward rent 
 
 200. See Benjamin, supra note 11, at 32–35; Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First 
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128–31 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban 
Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 
782–83 (1985). 
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seeking at the expense of the general public.201 Moreover, the government 
may not merely be an innocent bystander in the process of rent seeking by 
politically powerful groups; it may actually be following a policy of “rent 
extraction,” in which it deliberately restricts or threatens to restrict speech 
to create a pool of rents that can then be redistributed through the 
regulatory process.202 
In addition, liberty-oriented theorists would find interference with 
individual speakers’ editorial discretion to be a First Amendment harm, 
even in the absence of evidence that particular content was favored or 
disfavored. Access requirements are particularly problematic in this 
regard.203 Tellingly, the Supreme Court has found preserving editorial 
discretion to be an important First Amendment value even with respect to 
broadcasting, the medium of communications that receives the lowest level 
of constitutional protection.204 The Court has also repeatedly recognized 
that cable operators’ selection of the content they transmit represents an 
exercise of their free speech rights.205 Acknowledging that the interest in 
editorial discretion may be offset by other considerations206 does not 
change the fact that interference with a speaker’s liberty interest implicates 
important First Amendment values. 
 
 201. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 61–67 (2001). 
 202. See Benjamin, supra note 11, at 35–36 (suggesting that regulators reduce the total amount of 
spectrum-based speech in order to generate monopoly rents). For a general discussion on the process of 
rent extraction, see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
 203. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality opinion); 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Cf. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. 
Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the 
Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114–17 (1999) (describing the cognitive and dignitary 
harms associated with imposing affirmative content obligations on the media). 
 204. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1998); FCC v. League 
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 379–80 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
105–11, 118–21, 124–25 (1973). 
 205. As the Court noted in the Turner I decision, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the 
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.” 
Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). See also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); City of 
Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986). 
 206. The Court has acknowledged that the interest in preserving broadcasters’ editorial discretion 
must be balanced against the benefits to the public of being exposed to views that would otherwise be 
barred from the airwaves. See Ark. Educ. Television, 523 U.S. at 673–74; League of Women Voters, 468 
U.S. at 377–78; CBS, 412 U.S. at 101–02. With respect to cable, the Court has held that bottleneck 
control of cable operators justifies permitting some restriction of their editorial discretion. Turner I, 512 
U.S. at 656–57. 
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Lastly, as I have detailed above, many of the FCC’s structural 
restrictions have the unintended consequence of skewing media content 
toward certain demographic groups and stifling the emergence of more 
diverse programming. There can be little doubt that such content-specific 
effects raise serious constitutional concerns.207 
B. MINNEAPOLIS STAR AND THE SHORT-LIVED PROSPECT  
OF STRICT SCRUTINY 
Even though the structural regulations described above affect the 
quantity and mix of media content in ways that implicate the First 
Amendment, it is not completely clear what standard the courts would 
apply when evaluating the constitutionality of these regulations. It is now 
well established that regulations restricting speech on the basis of its 
content are subject to strict scrutiny.208 At the same time, the Supreme 
Court has squarely established that it does not regard the rationales that 
underlie structural regulation as content-based.209 
 
 207. Professor Baker suggests that because the market can have as much of an adverse impact on 
media content as structural regulations, market distortions should raise similar concerns under my 
approach to the First Amendment. See Baker, supra note 13, at 755–759. This ignores the state action 
doctrine, which represents one of the central underpinnings of classic liberal theory. See Yoo, supra 
note 11, at 331–34 (describing the difficulties in reconciling democratic theories of media policy with 
the state action doctrine). The role that state action plays in defining the relationship between the 
individual and the state explains why adverse speech effects resulting from governmental actions might 
be problematic, whereas similar effects resulting from private ordering would not. 
 208. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002); United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641–43; Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991); Ark. 
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987). 
 209. Turner I squarely concluded that each of the three policy goals underlying structural 
regulation—(1) the preservation of free, local television; (2) the promotion of a diversity of information 
sources, and (3) the promotion of competition—were unrelated to the content of message conveyed. 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662. See also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 798–801 
(1978) (holding that the promotion of diverse views is content-neutral).  
This conclusion is far from unassailable. As noted earlier, the goal of promoting diversity is 
intimately intertwined with who has the power to select, edit, and present speech. See supra note 77 and 
accompanying text. Similarly, the preference for localism clearly signifies the government’s conclusion 
that a particular type of speech is especially valuable. Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Turner I 
vigorously disputed the conclusion that promoting diversity and localism was content-neutral. See 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 677–78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Courts that have recognized the problematic 
nature of the conclusion that regulations designed to promote viewpoint diversity and localism are 
content-neutral have felt constrained to follow Turner I’s resolution of the issue. See Horton v. City of 
Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 192–94 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. FCC, 365 F.3d 
1156, 1169–70 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that promotion of a diversity of views and localism to be content-
neutral), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 634 (2004); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 
1041–42, 1046 (D.C. Cir.) (identifying the promotion of competition, diversity, and localism as the 
interests underlying the national television station ownership limits and holding them to be content-
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One line of decisions, associated with Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,210 appeared to entertain the 
possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the 
absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive. In 
Minneapolis Star, the Court expanded on a precedent invalidating a state 
tax that applied only to newspapers211 and applied strict scrutiny to strike 
down a generally applicable tax whose burden fell disproportionately on a 
small group of newspapers. In so doing, the Court framed the issues in a 
manner almost ideally suited for redressing the problems of architectural 
censorship. Strict scrutiny was not limited to instances in which the 
government acted out of an illicit motive.212 Instead, the Court recognized 
that “even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict 
unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.”213 As a 
result, any restriction “that singles out the press, or that targets individual 
publications within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify 
its action.”214 This language suggests that the doctrine is not designed 
solely to ferret out regulations that are mere facades for suppressing speech 
of a particular content or by particular speakers. Rather, Minneapolis Star 
could arguably be construed as applying to economic regulation that, 
though innocently enacted, has the unintended byproduct of adversely 
affecting the content of speech. 
The Supreme Court reinforced this line of jurisprudence in Arkansas 
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,215 in which it struck down a sales tax that 
exempted newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports 
journals. The Court held that the reasoning of Minneapolis Star applied a 
fortiori to a tax that differentiated on its face among different types of 
magazines on the basis of their content.216 Because the differential taxation 
of magazines represented sufficient grounds for striking down the sales tax, 
the Court declined to address whether the distinction drawn between 
newspapers and magazines also violated the First Amendment.217 
 
neutral), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Echostar 
Communications Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1210 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding the promotion of localism to be 
content-neutral). 
 210. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 211. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
 212. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 (“Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a 
violation of the First Amendment.”). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 592–93. 
 215. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 216. Id. at 229–30. 
 217. Id. at 232–33. 
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The Court would soon foreclose any prospect that Minneapolis Star 
and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship. In 
Leathers v. Medlock,218 the Court upheld a sales tax that applied to cable 
television but exempted satellite television providers as well as certain 
newspapers and magazines. The Court regarded the tax as a law of general 
applicability that did not single out the press for differential treatment.219 
The tax was not structured in a way that raised suspicions that it was 
intended to fall solely on a small group of media speakers.220 Even though 
the exemption for satellite television providers effectively created 
differential treatment for media that were functionally similar, the fact that 
the tax affected approximately one hundred cable suppliers obviated any 
suggestion that it penalized any particular speaker or the expression of any 
particular idea.221 
The Court reaffirmed the idea that the Minneapolis Star line of 
precedents only applies when a statute of general application affects a small 
number of speakers in its first Turner Broadcasting decision  
(“Turner I”).222 Rejecting the argument that must-carry should be subject to 
strict scrutiny, the Court distinguished the Minneapolis Star line of cases 
by pointing out that the restriction in question applied to large numbers of 
cable systems. As a result, it “d[id] not pose the same dangers of 
suppression and manipulation that were posed by the more narrowly 
targeted regulations in Minneapolis Star” and its progeny.223 
The limitations imposed by Leathers and Turner I drastically limit the 
Minneapolis Star line of cases’ potential for redressing the problem of 
architectural censorship.224 So long as the restriction in question applies to 
a sufficiently large number of entities, it does not matter that it favors one 
form of communication over another. The type of structural regulations that 
represent the focus of this Article will almost invariably apply to a 
sufficiently large number of entities to take them outside of this scope. 
 
 218. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). 
 219. Id. at 447. 
 220. Id. at 448. 
 221. Id. at 449. 
 222. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 223. Id. at 661. The Court alternatively noted that differential treatment may also be “‘justified by 
some special characteristic of’ the particular medium being regulated.” Id. at 660–61 (quoting 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)). The Court 
concluded that the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators represented just such a 
special characteristic. Id. at 661. 
 224. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers’ Project 
only apply to tax cases. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 68 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Walsh v. 
Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also Benjamin, supra note 11, at 29–30. 
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Indeed, Leathers and Turner I fundamentally altered the spirit of the 
Minneapolis Star line of cases, in effect suggesting that differential impacts 
caused by laws of general applicability only raise constitutional concerns 
when they betray some indicia of a clandestine desire to suppress 
expression. As such, Minneapolis Star no longer offers much promise of 
addressing architectural censorship that arises from the unintended 
consequences of economically motivated regulation. 
C. RATIONAL BASIS VS. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
Since the Supreme Court’s foreclosure of any real possibility of 
subjecting structural regulation to strict scrutiny, courts have struggled to 
determine whether the proper standard should be one of rational basis or 
intermediate scrutiny. The problem was presented quite nicely by the D.C. 
Circuit in News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC.225 News America is the 
result of a rider buried in a massive, 471-page continuing resolution 
appropriating funds for the entire federal government for fiscal year 
1988.226 The rider forbade the FCC from using any funds to extend any 
temporary waivers to the current newspaper/television crossownership rule. 
As the court noted, the statute was “general in form but not in reality.”227 
At the time, only one such temporary waiver had been issued: the one held 
by Rupert Murdoch that allowed him to own both WXNE-TV and the 
Boston Herald. 
Because this generally applicable statute had the effect of burdening a 
single speaker, it appeared to represent precisely the type of provision that 
would be subject to strict scrutiny under Minneapolis Star. The court 
instead evaluated the constitutionality of the rider under the lower level of 
First Amendment scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court to the 
newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule in FCC v. National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting (“NCCB”).228 There, the Court upheld the 
newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule as a “reasonable means of 
promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications.”229 
 
 225. News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 226. This is in contrast to the usual practice, in which the federal budget is enacted through a 
series of thirteen appropriations acts. The continuing resolution was also unusual in that the text of the 
legislation was printed only in a 1194-page conference report. See id. at 801–02. 
 227. Id. at 802. 
 228. Id. at 810–11 (citing FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)). See 
also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (applying a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny to 
broadcasting to sustain the Chain Broadcasting Rules). 
 229. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 802. 
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Other courts addressing constitutional challenges to structural regulation of 
the broadcast industry have felt obligated to follow NCCB.230 
Several aspects of this decision are quite problematic. NCCB was 
based on the longstanding rationale that the physical scarcity of the 
electromagnetic spectrum justifies conferring a lesser degree of First 
Amendment protection on broadcasting than on other media.231 Over the 
years, however, a stream of commentary has undermined the vitality of the 
scarcity doctrine by demonstrating its analytical incoherence.232 In 
addition, technological developments allowing for more intensive use of 
the spectrum and the advent of cable television have lessened the extent to 
which the spectrum serves as a bottleneck for transmitting media speech. 
The Supreme Court seems to have backed away from the doctrine as well. 
Not only has the Court declined invitations to extend it to other forms of 
communication,233 its recent decisions raise serious questions as to its 
continuing vitality even with respect to broadcasting.234 
 
 230. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 401–02 (3d Cir. 2004); Sinclair Broad. 
Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 
F.3d 1027, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). See also Sinclair 
Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 172 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 
13,625–27 ¶¶ 13–16. As the D.C. Circuit noted in another case involving the newspaper/broadcast 
crossownership rule, “We are stuck with the scarcity doctrine until the day that the Supreme Court tells 
us that the Red Lion no longer rules the broadcast jungle.” Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
 231.  Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 799. The scarcity doctrine has its roots in the 
seminal decision on broadcast regulation, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226–27 (1943), and has 
been reaffirmed many times since then. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566–67 (1990), 
overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374–77 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394–96 
(1981); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101–02 (1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969). 
 232. The academic criticism of the constitutionality of the scarcity doctrine is voluminous. See 
generally Yoo, supra note 11, at 266–92 (reviewing and extending the leading critiques of scarcity). 
Tellingly, even proponents of broadcast regulation no longer attempt to defend the scarcity doctrine. 
See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87–90 (1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 110; 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children’s Television 
Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1247 (1996); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A 
New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 
1701–05 (1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1993). 
 233. The Supreme Court has rejected attempts to extend the broadcast regime to the mail, 
telephony, and the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (Internet); Sable 
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (telephony); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 10 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (mail); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (mail); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542–
43 (1980) (mail). But see Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 974–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(extending the broadcast rationale to DBS). For a time, the Court appeared to entertain the possibility of 
extending the broadcast justification to cable television. Compare Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 637–39 
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In addition, this broad reading of NCCB is hard to square with Turner 
I, which rejected extending the Court’s broadcast precedents to cable 
television. Notwithstanding the Court’s acknowledgement of other courts’ 
and commentators’ criticisms of the scarcity doctrine’s analytical 
coherence,235 the Court declined to revisit the applicability of the scarcity 
doctrine to broadcasting in a case that did not properly present the issue.236 
Because cable does not depend on the broadcast spectrum, it does not 
suffer from the “inherent limitations” and “danger of physical interference” 
that supposedly confront broadcasting.237 At the same time, the Court held 
that “laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special 
treatment” must be subject to some measure of heightened scrutiny.238 As a 
result, the Court followed a line of D.C. Circuit cases239 and concluded that 
the proper standard was the level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral 
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech as announced in 
United States v. O’Brien.240 Unlike the NCCB standard, which is stated in 
 
(1994) (rejecting the application of the broadcast regime to uphold must-carry), with Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737–48, 755 (1996) (plurality opinion) (suggesting 
that Turner I did not foreclose applying the broadcast regime to uphold behavioral regulation of cable 
television). This possibility was subsequently foreclosed by the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–14 (2000) (5-4 decision). 
 234. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have avoided reliance on the traditional justifications 
and have instead turned to other doctrines to justify holding the regulation under review to a lower level 
of First Amendment scrutiny. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 
(1999) (commercial speech); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (public 
forum doctrine); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (commercial speech). 
 235. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638 & n.5. 
 236. Id. at 638 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376, n.11 (1984)). 
 237. Id. at 638–39. 
 238. Id. at 640–41. 
 239. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298–304 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(invalidating revised must-carry regulations), clarified by 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Quincy Cable 
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454–62 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invalidating initial must-carry regulations); 
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 14, 48–50 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating regulations 
restricting pay television). The must-carry decisions did not formally decide that O’Brien provided the 
appropriate basis for evaluating the constitutionality of must-carry. Because the courts concluded that 
the restrictions under review failed the more lenient level of scrutiny announced in O’Brien, they found 
it unnecessary to resolve whether the regulations should be subjected to a more stringent standard of 
review, such as strict scrutiny. See Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 298; Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d 
at 1448, 1450–54. 
 240. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661–62 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). Turner I 
thus represented the culmination of a fairly remarkable transformation of O’Brien doctrine. Originally 
applicable only to general regulations that had a tangential impact on speech, following Turner I, 
O’Brien doctrine is now applicable to direct regulations of speech so long as they are content-neutral. 
For an insightful discussion of pre-Turner I cases applying O’Brien to direct restrictions of speech, see 
Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 649–58 (1988). 
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terms reminiscent of rational basis,241 the O’Brien standard employs 
language that suggests an intermediate level of scrutiny.242 
The language in Turner I holding that all regulations targeting a 
certain element of the press were necessarily subject to some form of 
heightened scrutiny seems to apply with equal force to structural regulation 
imposed on broadcasting. Courts have struggled to reconcile these two 
precedents. Some courts have attempted to rely on a technology-based 
distinction, applying the NCCB standard to the structural regulation of 
broadcasting,243 while applying the Turner I standard to structural 
regulation of the cable industry.244 They point out that, although Turner I 
acknowledged the analytical deficiencies with the scarcity doctrine, it 
explicitly declined to question its continuing validity with respect to 
broadcasting.245 
Attempts to draw technology-based distinctions suffer from severe 
analytical problems. Most obviously, they do not provide a basis for 
determining the appropriate standard of review to be applied to 
crossownership of broadcast and nonbroadcast media. Indeed, the FCC’s 
2003 Biennial Review Order recognizes the conundrum posed by 
crossownership restrictions. Although the FCC maintains that
 
 241. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 242. Specifically, O’Brien requires that the restriction in question “further[] an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The first prong focuses on the 
constitutional authority to impose the regulation rather than the First Amendment. The third prong is the 
equivalent of a threshold inquiry into whether the restriction is content-based. The remaining two 
prongs, which require a “substantial government interest” that is “no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest,” are analogous to classic intermediate scrutiny. See Michael C. Dorf, 
Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1202 (1996); Srikanth 
Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization 
of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 404 (1995). 
 243. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 167–69 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 244. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Time 
Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1316–19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Time Warner Entm’t 
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966–67, 967–73, 978–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 
56 F.3d 151, 181–86 (D.C. Cir. 1995); US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100–06 (9th Cir. 
1995) (striking down cable/telephone company crossownership), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 1155 
(1996). 
 245. See Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 161–62; Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1046. 
Cf. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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crossownership restrictions will be subject only to rational basis scrutiny, it 
acknowledges that because they 
[w]ill limit the speech opportunities not only for broadcasters, but also 
for other entities that may seek to own and operate broadcast outlets 
(including those with the fullest First Amendment protection—
newspapers), we should draw the rule as narrowly as possible in order to 
serve our public interest goals while imposing the least possible burden 
on the freedom of expression.246 
At the same time, the FCC acknowledged the possible relevance of the 
cable precedents by ensuring that the crossownership rules are “narrowly 
tailored.”247 
The distinction between broadcast and nonbroadcast media is likely to 
be clouded still further by the growing functional similarity between 
different television technologies.248 For example, television broadcasters 
are now in a position to use the enhanced efficiency made possible by 
digital transmission to begin to provide multichannel service.249 In 
addition, the emergence of DBS systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish 
Network, has rendered spectrum-based and wireline television technologies 
largely interchangeable. As a result, it would seem quite strange to subject 
functionally identical technologies to drastically different First Amendment 
standards. Indeed, courts have reacted with some confusion as to the proper 
standard of review to be applied to DBS regulations. While some courts 
have applied the more lenient broadcast standard to DBS, other courts have 
 
 246. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,793 ¶ 441. 
 247. Id. at 13,798 ¶ 455 & n.988 (citing Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1135). Courts have largely 
been able to avoid addressing the merits of this issue. On a few occasions, it arose in the context of the 
newspaper/broadcast crossownership restrictions and thus was squarely controlled by NCCB. See 
Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998). When the issue arose in the context of the 
cable/broadcast crossownership rule, the D.C. Circuit was able to avoid the issue by disposing of it on 
statutory grounds. See Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1049. The only court that attempted to 
reconcile the ambiguity created by these competing standards of review held that the heightened 
scrutiny mandated by Turner I applied only when a regulation singles out a subclass of broadcasters and 
did not apply to regulations imposing obligations on broadcasters as a whole. See Sinclair Broad. 
Group, 284 F.3d at 168. This resolution is inconsistent with Turner I, which concluded that heightened 
scrutiny is applicable to any laws that “single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special 
treatment.” Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). Indeed, Turner I’s limitation of Minneapolis Star to 
cases in which regulations single out small numbers of media speakers suggests that the distinction 
identified in Sinclair Broadcasting is better suited to identifying situations subject to strict scrutiny than 
to determining whether to apply rational basis or intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 659–61. 
 248. See Yoo, supra note 45, at 227–29. 
 249. See id. at 213, 227. 
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subjected structural regulation of DBS to the higher level of scrutiny 
mandated by Turner I.250 
Even courts that agree that NCCB provides the appropriate First 
Amendment standard have expressed confusion over the proper way to 
apply that standard of review. Some courts have construed NCCB as 
holding that structural regulation of the broadcast industry is subject only to 
rational basis scrutiny.251 Other courts have construed NCCB as requiring 
them to apply intermediate scrutiny.252 Still others have applied a standard 
of review that falls somewhere in between.253 Thus, even if one were to 
settle on the particular constitutional standard to be applied, considerable 
confusion would remain as to precisely what that standard requires. 
D. APPLYING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ultimately, it may not matter precisely how this dispute is resolved. 
This is because even the most stringent of these tests—intermediate 
scrutiny under O’Brien—has long been criticized as too deferential. As 
noted earlier, the heart of the O’Brien standard requires that the restriction 
 
 250. Compare Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying 
the more lenient broadcast standard to sustain a statute requiring a DBS provider to set aside channel 
capacity for “noncommercial programming of an educational or informational nature” (citation 
omitted)), with Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352–66 (4th Cir. 
2001) (applying the intermediate scrutiny of Turner I to sustain a statute requiring satellite broadcasters 
to carry local stations). These precedents cannot be squared with either the Supreme Court’s broadcast 
or cable precedents. Under the broadcast precedents, one would have expected structural regulation of 
DBS to be subject to rational basis scrutiny under NCCB and behavioral regulation to be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under League of Women Voters. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 
436 U.S. 775 (1978); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). Because Satellite 
Broadcasting & Communications Ass’n applied intermediate scrutiny to structural regulation, these 
cases do not place DBS within the broadcast paradigm. Under the Supreme Court’s cable precedents, 
one would have expected structural regulation of DBS to be subject to intermediate scrutiny under 
Turner I and behavioral regulation to be subject to strict scrutiny under United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813–15 (2000). Because Time Warner applied something less 
than strict scrutiny to behavioral regulation, see Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975, these cases fall outside 
the cable paradigm as well. 
 251. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 401–02 (3d Cir. 2004); Sinclair 
Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–68. Cf. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046–47 
(D.C. Cir.) (limiting heightened scrutiny to content-based restrictions on broadcast speech while 
holding that structural regulations were subject only to “deferential review”), modified on reh’g, 293 
F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 252. See, e.g., News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also 
Benjamin, supra note 11, at 54–64 (arguing that broadcast regulation is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny). 
 253. See Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 243–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that more 
than minimal rationality is required when a structural regulation has the effect of completely prohibiting 
an individual from using a particular communications medium). 
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“further[] an important or substantial governmental interest” and that “the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”254 The requirement that 
the regulation further a “substantial” governmental interest has been 
construed to require only that the interest be nontrivial without requiring it 
to be particularly significant.255 Any lack of substantiality can also be 
obviated by raising the level of generality until the requirement is met.256 
O’Brien’s tailoring requirement has proven to be equally permissive. 
Although initially stated in somewhat restrictive terms, the Court has 
subsequently reinterpreted it to be satisfied whenever the underlying 
government interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.”257 This reconstruction of the tailoring requirement represents a 
comparison of the various means available to the government, rather than 
an inquiry into whether the strength of the government interest justifies the 
intrusion on individual liberty. As a result, O’Brien doctrine devolves into a 
regulatory inquiry focusing solely on the extent to which the means chosen 
promote the government’s goals.258 
The result is a level of scrutiny that has been repeatedly criticized as 
tantamount to the presumption of nonprotection associated with rational 
basis review,259 reaching only “laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition 
of expression.”260 Unless O’Brien scrutiny is given more bite,261 it is of 
little practical consequence whether any particular instance of structural 
regulation is formally subject to rational basis scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, or something in between.262 
 
 254. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 397 (1968). 
 255. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 
1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23. 
 256. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1486 n.17 (1975); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 51 (1987). 
 257.  Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 
(1985))).  
 258. Werhan, supra note 240, at 672. Werhan further notes, “There is no speech side to the 
Court’s balance. The Justices assess only the operational efficiency of the government’s regulatory 
agenda, avoiding any consideration of whether that program is ‘commensurably more important’ than 
the [F]irst [A]mendment values advanced by the expression at issue.” Id. at 641–42 (footnote omitted). 
 259. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 200, at 787–88; Stone, supra note 256, at 50–52. 
 260. Ely, supra note 256, at 1485–86. 
 261. See infra Part III.B (exploring this possibility). 
 262. Professor Baker argues that evaluating the constitutionality of structural regulation on the 
basis of the rationales proffered by the FCC risks overlooking the true rationales underlying structural 
regulations and their most important effects. See Baker, supra note 13, at 759–760. The Supreme 
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III.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP 
Thus, First Amendment doctrine does not appear to provide for 
meaningful judicial review of architectural censorship. This Part explores 
two possible solutions to this problem. First, it entertains the possibility of 
leaving matters unchanged and relying on Congress and the FCC to protect 
against architectural censorship. Second, it explores the possibility of 
revising O’Brien doctrine to allow for more meaningful judicial review. 
A. RELIANCE ON THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
One alternative is to leave the responsibility for protecting against the 
dangers of architectural censorship squarely in the hands of the political 
branches. A long and distinguished heritage offers support for such a 
proposal. Indeed, the authority of each coordinate branch to interpret the 
Constitution has been endorsed by such historical luminaries as James 
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, Stephen 
Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and Felix Frankfurter,263 as well as by a 
veritable “all-star list of constitutional law scholars.”264 Such a claim might 
seem somewhat jarring to those steeped in the ringing declaration of 
Marbury v. Madison265 that “[i]t is empathically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”266 To say, however, that the 
courts have authority to construe the Constitution is not to say that they 
have the exclusive authority to do so. Indeed, Marbury is based on the 
 
Court’s adoption of the “substantial evidence” test in Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994), would seem 
to justify focusing solely on the rationales and factual inferences that were before Congress and the 
FCC, and would limit reviewing courts to assessing the goals and the means asserted by the 
government. 
 263. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–26 
(1992); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21–28 (11th ed. 1985); WALTER F. MURPHY, 
JAMES E. FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 195–247 
(1986); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of the Judiciary’s Interpretation of 
the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771, 777–82 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman 
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 84–
97 (1993). 
 264. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 49 n.26 (1993) (noting that Alexander Bickel, Edward Corwin, Philip 
Kurland, Gerald Gunther, Henry Monaghan, and Herbert Wechsler had each endorsed the authority of 
all three coordinate branches to interpret the Constitution). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & 
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1451, 1463–72 (1997) (providing an overview of the debate on coordinate construction). 
 265. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 266. Id. at 177. 
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premise that “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”267 Legislators and executive 
branch officials routinely apply the Constitution to particular factual 
contexts. Thus, in firmly establishing the judiciary’s right to interpret the 
Constitution, Marbury implicitly recognized the other branches’ authority 
to do so as well.268 
The fact that Congress and the executive branch are competent to 
interpret and enforce the Constitution does not necessarily justify leaving 
important issues of constitutional interpretation exclusively in their hands. 
The judiciary bears an obligation to exercise its independent constitutional 
judgment even when other branches are in a position to offer their own 
assessment of the constitutionality of a particular governmental action.269 
From this perspective, allowing instances of architectural censorship to 
evade meaningful judicial scrutiny would represent a disturbing abdication 
of responsibility. 
Whether the political branches will prove particularly effective in 
protecting against the dangers of architectural censorship is also 
questionable. Members of Congress are typically loath to consider 
constitutional issues. As Abner Mikva, who as a judge and former member 
of the House of Representatives was uniquely well situated to comment on 
the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature on matters of 
constitutional interpretation, once observed, “The fastest way to empty out 
the chamber [of Congress] is to get up and say, ‘I’d like to talk about the 
constitutionality of this bill.’ Members of Congress believe that’s what 
courts are for.”270 Agencies are often equally reluctant to address 
constitutional issues,271 as has been the case for the FCC.272 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2, at 25 (2d ed. 1988); 
Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 
GA. L. REV. 57, 63 (1986); Merrill, supra note 264, at 51; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to 
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 37 (1969). 
 269. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 129 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843–44 (1978). 
 270. Linda Greenhouse, What’s a Lawmaker to Do About the Constitution?, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
1988, at B6. See also Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 
61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983) (arguing that Congress should do more to discover constitutional 
shortcomings in legislation). 
 271. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (noting that “adjudication of the 
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of 
administrative agencies” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan, First 
Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1970) (describing how agencies can suffer 
from “institutional ‘tunnel vision’” that makes them more likely to frame questions of speech in terms 
of the regulatory issues with which they have been charged than in terms of the First Amendment). 
YOOBAKE19.DOC 3/28/2005 4:30 PM 
2005] ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP 727 
B. INTENSIFYING O’BRIEN SCRUTINY 
The other alternative is to refine First Amendment doctrine to give the 
courts a larger role in reviewing instances of architectural censorship. A 
plurality of the Supreme Court in Turner I experimented with this option 
when it incorporated into O’Brien scrutiny the requirement that the “recited 
harms [be] real, not merely nonconjectural, and that the regulation . . . 
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”273 To determine 
whether legislative findings satisfied this requirement, the Court balanced 
two opposing considerations. On the one hand was the fact that the 
legislative branch is better suited institutionally to make predictive 
judgments and is not required to produce the kind of record generally 
required of administrative agencies.274 On the other hand was the 
recognition that blanket deference to legislative findings would constitute 
abdication of the judiciary’s role in protecting the Constitution. To balance 
these two considerations, the Court borrowed the administrative law 
principle requiring the government to have “drawn reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence.”275 
The overall thrust of this development led many commentators to 
speculate whether the addition of this requirement would turn O’Brien 
scrutiny into a more meaningful form of judicial review.276 Historically, 
courts have been quite reluctant to second guess the evidentiary findings 
made by Congress and the FCC. As the Court has noted, its “opinions have 
repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding how the 
public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference.”277 
On other occasions, the Court has been slightly more circumspect, 
declining to “defer” to the other branches, but nonetheless “afford[ing] 
 
 272. For example, the FCC initially declined to repeal the Fairness Doctrine notwithstanding 
serious doubts as to its constitutionality. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 
F.C.C.2d 145, 147 ¶ 6, 148–57 ¶¶ 8–21, 246–47- ¶¶ 175–176 (1985), vacated sub nom. Radio-
Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The FCC’s refusal to address the 
issue drew a sharp rebuke from the D.C. Circuit, which chided, “we are aware of no precedent that 
permits a federal agency to ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely 
because the resolution would be politically awkward.” Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
 273. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)). 
 274. Id. at 665–66. 
 275. Id. at 666. 
 276. See Dorf, supra note 242, at 1201 n.101; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment 
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1263 n.67 (1995). 
 277. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (citing FCC v. Nat’l Citizens 
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)). See also FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946). 
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great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the 
Commission” and “pay[ing] careful attention to how the other branches of 
Government have addressed the same problem” when confronted with “a 
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers.”278 
There are some indications that the Court may now be willing to 
engage in more searching scrutiny of the factual predicate underlying 
statutory enactments. For example, the Court has shown its willingness to 
scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidentiary record in other contexts, 
including the Commerce Clause,279 warrantless searches under the Fourth 
Amendment,280 and most notably Congress’s exercise of its authority under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.281 The Court’s willingness to rely 
on the absence of a real, nonconjectural harm to strike down restrictions of 
commercial speech also makes this argument quite plausible.282 Indeed, 
shortly thereafter, various courts invoked this consideration to invalidate a 
number of restrictions on the cable industry.283 Some courts have seen in 
Turner I the emergence of a stricter standard, one that will govern all 
content-neutral regulations that discriminate amongst the media.284 
Subsequent developments have substantially reduced the likelihood 
that the factual review announced by the Turner I plurality will 
 
 278. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1973). Accord Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 569 (1990) (quoting and following the above-quoted language from CBS), 
overruled on other grounds, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 279. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–18 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995). 
 280. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318–22 (1997). 
 281. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–72 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 88–90 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997). But see Nev. Dep’t 
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–40 (2003) (sustaining the sufficiency of the legislative 
record underlying the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
 282. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489–91 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. 
& Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 144–49 (1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771–73 (1993); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 648–49 (1985). See also 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 476–77 (1995). 
 283. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating cable 
broadcast crossownership rule); Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
summary judgment was granted in error in evaluating the fee charged on non-locally produced cable 
programs); US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating the 
cable/telephone company crossownership ban), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated, 516 
U.S. 415 (1996); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(invalidating the issuance of an exclusive cable franchise). See also Comcast Cablevision of Broward 
County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (stating in dicta that ordinance 
requiring open access to cable modem systems would have failed intermediate scrutiny). 
 284. See Netanel, supra note 201, at 55–58. 
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significantly check architectural censorship. When the Court restated these 
principles in its second Turner decision (“Turner II”), it employed a far 
different tone. Noticeably missing from the opinion was any reference to 
judicial exercise of “independent judgment” or inquiry into whether the 
harm was “nonconjectural.” Instead, the language and the structure of the 
opinion emphasized deference.285 Later decisions have raised further 
doubts as to whether Turner I’s imposition of a substantial evidence 
requirement will actually lead to more searching judicial review. In Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,286 the Court noted that “[t]he 
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial 
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.”287 In particular, the Court 
acknowledged the possibility, first noted by the plurality opinion in City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,288 that the government could rely on a 
factual record developed in another context or jurisdiction so long as the 
evidence on which the record is based is reasonably believed to be 
relevant.289 A plurality of the Court reaffirmed this position in City of Erie 
v. Pap’s A.M.,290 concluding that the City of Erie could rely on the 
evidentiary foundations laid out in Renton291 and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc.292 
 
 285. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997). See also Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First 
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 935, 937–38 (1998) (noting that “[w]ithout a 
doubt, the Court’s decision in Turner II undercut what many thought to be the effect of Turner I” and 
lamenting the opportunity to engage in meaningful scrutiny of the relationship between ends and 
means). For an excellent analysis of the differences between Turner I and Turner II, see Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 301–03 (2000). 
 286. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). 
 287. Id. It bears noting that this language is clearly dicta. After noting this possibility, the Court 
explicitly acknowledged the existence of a sufficient factual basis. Id. at 393–94. 
 288. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986). 
 289. Shrink Mo. Gov’t., 528 U.S. at 393 n.6. 
 290. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–97 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 291. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50–51 (relying on the factual record recited in a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Washington upholding a restriction on nude dancing in Seattle). 
 292. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 & n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion). Even 
more disturbing is the suggestion that the City of Erie’s invocation of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), would have been sufficient alone to sustain the 
restriction under review. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297. As Justice Souter noted in dissent, the 
plurality opinion in Barnes did not purport to rely on any factual evidence indicating the existence of a 
problem. Id. at 315 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Permitting a mere citation of 
Barnes to satisfy Turner I’s substantial evidence requirement would effectively gut the substantial 
evidence standard and would condone a form of constitutional bootstrapping that would be quite 
unprincipled. 
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In any event, even if the substantial evidence requirement advanced by 
the Turner I plurality survives as a basis for more searching scrutiny under 
the O’Brien standard, it is unlikely to redress the type of architectural 
censorship discussed in this Article. Commentators have long regarded 
O’Brien doctrine as uncovering restrictions driven by an improper 
government motive.293 Indeed, the search for illicit purpose best supports 
putting the government to its proof in the manner dictated by Turner I.294 
As such, adding this element is unlikely to bear on architectural 
censorship, which is generally the unintended byproduct of truly innocent 
governmental actions.295 Even under this invigorated form, O’Brien 
scrutiny would do little to balance the importance of the governmental 
interest asserted vis-à-vis the individual’s interest to engage in speech. Nor 
would it lead courts to inquire whether alternative avenues of 
communication exist or whether the same goals could be accomplished in a 
less intrusive manner. Architectural censorship would be better addressed 
through a test focusing on a regulation’s effects on speech. Such tests, 
however, are generally disfavored, largely due to concerns that employing 
an effects test would open an unacceptably large swath of governmental 
action to constitutional scrutiny.296 
 
 293. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1975) (suggesting that the real teaching of O’Brien, despite the Court’s 
contrary language, was that “some motives are unconstitutional”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public 
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 
438–42, 491–505 (1996) (arguing that O’Brien is primarily designed to expose regulations animated by 
improper governmental motives); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
767, 775–76 (2001) (concluding that “the O’Brien test itself is centrally concerned with legislative 
purpose, despite the Court’s protests to the contrary”); Srinivasan, supra note 242, at 420 (synthesizing 
the Court’s jurisprudence on incidental restrictions on speech as focusing on “a concern with speech-
suppressive administrative motivation”). Interestingly, this reading of O’Brien is inconsistent with 
O’Brien itself, which disavowed that it was designed to identify illicit legislative motive. See United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968). 
 294. See Netanel, supra note 201, at 61–62 (arguing that the invigorated intermediate scrutiny of 
Turner I is designed to root out improper governmental motive). 
 295. See Redish, supra note 200, at 130–31 (concluding that content-neutral regulations enacted 
without illicit motives can nonetheless skew speech markets in impermissible ways); Stone, supra note 
256, at 106–07 (observing that properly motivated regulations may still have an adverse incidental 
impact on speech); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 615, 658 (1991) (noting that “even regulations serving a noncommunicative purpose can have a 
discriminatory effect on the speech market available to would-be listeners”). 
 296. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 84–86 (1997); Dorf, supra note 242, at 1178; Schauer, supra note 
200, at 784, 790. Cf. Kagan, supra note 293, at 413–14 (criticizing the effects tests). 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis advanced in this Article demonstrates that the current 
debate has taken a far too simplistic approach to the impact that media 
ownership rules can have on television and radio program content. The 
analysis set forth reveals that the relationship between structural regulation 
and media content is much more complex than is generally recognized. 
Even worse, the current regulatory regime has all too often unintentionally 
degraded the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming available. In 
other words, structural regulation can represent a form of architectural 
censorship that can reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of media 
programming. Unfortunately, current First Amendment doctrine effectively 
immunizes architectural censorship from meaningful constitutional 
scrutiny. As a result, either Congress or the FCC must bear the primary 
responsibility for safeguarding free speech values against these dangers, or 
the courts must revise O’Brien doctrine to permit more searching review 
capable of protecting the important speech interests at stake. Neither 
outcome appears likely at this point. 
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